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ABSTRACT
American civil litigation in federal courts operates under a presumption
of party dominance. Parties choose the lawsuit structure, factual predicates,
and legal arguments, and the court accepts these choices. Further, parties
enter ubiquitous ex ante agreements that purport to alter the law governing
their dispute, along with a chorus of calls for even more party-driven cus-
tomization of litigation. The assumption behind this model of party domi-
nance is that parties substantially control both the law that will govern their
dispute and the judges that oversee it. This Article challenges that assumption
by explicating a reoriented model of party subordinance. Under this theory,
parties fall in the lowest tier of the power hierarchy, beneath the law on top
and judicial authority in the middle. Party subordinance means that the law-
not party agreement-binds the court, and even when parties can lawfully
make litigation choices, those choices generally do not bind the court. The
upshot is that parties in fact have far less control over their litigation than
presently assumed. Party subordinance suggests that the trend toward litiga-
tion customization is on shakier footing than presently acknowledged, re-
orients some key elements of the normative debate surrounding
customization, and exerts significant pressure in important doctrinal areas, in-
cluding personal jurisdiction, forum selection, choice of law, and motion
waiver. At its broadest, the theory of party subordinance upends the way the
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INTRODUCTION
How much control do parties have over federal litigation? Con-
ventional wisdom says they have quite a bit. The American system of
adversarial litigation and judicial passivity assumes that the parties get
to frame the lawsuit structure, factual predicates, and legal arguments,
while the court intervenes only to decide any motions the parties
choose to make. Plaintiffs can refuse to assert claims, defendants can
forfeit defenses, parties can stipulate to discovery limits and the au-
thenticity of evidence, and courts do not disturb those choices. As
Chief Justice John Roberts famously testified during his confirmation
hearings, federal judges are umpires, not players-disinterested neu-
trals acting only when called upon to do so and according to the cir-
cumstances presented by the parties.,
The primary exception tends to prove the rule. Federal subject
matter jurisdiction remains exclusively within the court's authority,
such that parties cannot waive, forfeit, or concede it, and the court has
an independent obligation to raise such jurisdictional defects sua
1 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John
G. Roberts, Jr.); see also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1041-45 (1975); David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1634, 1638 (2009); cf Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) ("The
premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of
legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by
the parties before them.").
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sponte.2 This exception for subject matter jurisdiction is so clear and
so entrenched3 that it implies the inverse for all nonjurisdictional mat-
ters; party agreement, waiver, forfeiture, and concession cabin the
scope of the court's nonjurisdictional adjudicatory authority.4
Extreme forms of the principle of party control have expanded to
support the recent trend of customized litigation.5 As one commenta-
tor recently put it, "parties have virtually unlimited rights to control
their disputes."6 Parties today purport to select-often ex ante-their
desired locations, the substantive law, and the procedures that will
govern their dispute.7 After all, if parties can settle a lawsuit accord-
ing to terms that reflect neither fact nor law, and if they can choose to
arbitrate in a private forum according to whatever substantive and
procedural standards they desire,8 why can't they exercise the same
level of control in federal court?9 The result is that, today, parties
often assert a position of dominance over both the law and the courts,
2 See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 6-7
(2011).
3 See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1444-46 (2011).
4 See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2008).
5 For one of the earliest explorations of the trend, see generally Linda S. Mullenix, An-
other Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal
Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988).
6 Brian S. Thomley, Comment, Nothing Is Sacred: Why Georgia and California Cannot
Bar Contractual Jury Waivers in Federal Court, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 127, 132 (2008).
7 See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 507, 510-11 (2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L.
REV. 723, 732, 744-46 (2011); see also Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 593, 597-98 (2005) (noting a strong trend toward "contract procedure"). But cf David A.
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 419-20 (finding little cus-
tomization outside of forum-selection, choice-of-law, fee-shifting, service-of-process, and jury-
waiver clauses); Erin A. O'Hara O'Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, Carve-Outs and Con-
tractual Procedure 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No.
13-29, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 13-16), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stractid=2279520 (asserting that the available empirical evidence reveals surprisingly little use
of customized procedural rules in contracts between sophisticated parties).
8 See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40
TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, 512 (2005) (asserting that parties may dispense with precedent and even
written reasoning in certain kinds of arbitration).
9 See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 516 (2009) ("Why should certain procedural rules be in-
flexible, inalienable obligations when so much of dispute resolution is subject to private ordering
through such mechanisms as settlements and agreements to arbitrate or mediate?"). But see
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1329, 1354 (2012) (characterizing arguments for private procedural ordering based on the
existence of arbitration as "extremely weak" because of the substantial differences between the
forums).
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in which parties stand at the apex of the litigation hierarchy, with the
law next and courts subordinated to the bottom.10
Yet there has always been unease over how much control parties
should have.,, Judges who would not dare impanel a jury over both
parties' valid jury-trial waivers understandably express resistance to
extremely unorthodox party stipulations, such as an agreement that
the judge's decision be based upon a coin flip or that the jury be com-
posed of monkeys.12
More difficult middle-ground questions abound in the broad
daylight between a routine jury-trial waiver and a hypothetical coin-
flip adjudication. Consider a state prisoner who, having unsuccess-
fully exhausted his claims in state court, seeks a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court, alleging that his detention violates the U.S. Constitu-
tion. His federal petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),13 which sets a standard
of review that is highly deferential to the state courts' determination
of his claims.14 Nevertheless, he asserts that the federal court should
review his claims de novo, and the State respondent does not chal-
lenge that assertion. Should the district court decide the petition
based upon AEDPA's deferential standard or upon the standard ef-
fectively adopted by the parties? If the district court grants the peti-
tion based upon de novo review, and the State appeals on the ground
that the district court should have applied the correct standard not-
withstanding the State's failure to urge it in the district court, what
should the appellate court do?15
10 See David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selec-
tion Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 980-81 (2008) (asserting that the conven-
tional "assumption [is] that procedural rules can in fact be bargained around").
11 See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1027,
1030-31 (2014).
12 See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozin-
ski, J., concurring) (opining that an arbitration provision that the judge would review an award
"by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl" would be unenforceable); Baravati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (doubting that parties
could "authoriz[e] trial by battle or ordeal, or ... by a panel of three monkeys"); United States v.
Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985) (musing that parties could not agree that the jury be
composed of twelve apes); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A
Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Con-
trol, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2002) ("Certainly a court would not enforce an agreement
to resolve a dispute by judicial coin toss . . . .").
13 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
15 This exact issue has come up repeatedly and has divided the circuits. Compare James v.
[Vol. 83:14
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This specific example reveals the deeper issue: to what extent do
party choices-agreements, waivers, forfeitures, omissions, and con-
cessions-constrain the court or alter the law? On the one hand,
party choice can reduce litigation costs by streamlining the case and
simplifying the issues.16 Party choice also accords with notions of ad-
versarialism, judicial passivity, and litigant autonomy that undergird
American litigation.17 On the other hand, there is something un-
seemly about parties commandeering a public tribunal to adjudicate
according to their private whims, especially if they force a judge to
rely upon and potentially endorse (perhaps with precedential reper-
cussions) an incorrect statement of law or fact or an odd procedural
rule."'
The federal courts have attempted to reconcile these tensions
through an ad hoc, case-specific approach that has resulted in a woe-
Ryan, 679 F.3d 780, 802 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding AEDPA's deferential standard to be waivable),
cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013), judgment reinstated, 733 F.3d 911
(9th Cir. 2013), with Lyons v. Brady, 666 F.3d 51, 54 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying a deferential
standard even though the parties briefed the issues based on a de novo standard), Gardner v.
Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding AEDPA's standard to be nonwaivable), and
Brown v. Smith, 551 F.3d 424, 428 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).
16 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 446-47 (2004);
Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on
Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2013); Gary Lawson, Stipulating the
Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1203 (2011); Rhee, supra note 9, at 517; Robert E. Scott & George
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856 (2006); Charles W.
Tyler, Note, Lawmaking in the Shadow of the Bargain: Contract Procedure as a Second-Best
Alternative to Mandatory Arbitration, 122 YALE L.J. 1560, 1574-75 (2013).
17 See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories
of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 509-11 (2003); Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advo-
cacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 458-60, 495-508 (2009); Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 16, at 1475-76;
cf Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 464, 479-91 (2007) (making the case that deference to party choice
improves litigant acceptance of judicial decrees). See generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS
ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH To ADJUDICATION 35-39 (1988) (extol-
ling the virtues of judicial passivity in the adversary system). Several scholars have relied on
adversarialism to reject broad issue-creation authority in appellate courts. See Robert J. Marti-
neau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1023, 1060 (1987); Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at
Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 272-73 (2002); see also Barry
A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be
Heard, 39 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1253, 1308 (2002) (arguing that even if appellate courts should
have greater ability to raise issues, there should still be a waiver rule to prevent gamesmanship).
18 See Bone, supra note 9, at 1384; Dodge, supra note 7, at 729; Frost, supra note 17, at 515;
Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 16, at 1475; Resnik, supra note 7, at 623; cf Allan D. Vestal,
Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 508-11 (1959) (argu-
ing that appellate courts should raise issues sua sponte when necessary to give accurate effect to
a law with significant public implications).
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fully undertheorized default presumption of party dominance, pock-
marked by similarly undertheorized exceptions.19
The growing literature exploring the relationship among parties,
courts, and the law has done better, but, to date, it has focused almost
exclusively on normative positions purporting to justify lines between
the presumption and its exceptions.20 This normative conversation in-
forms second-order questions of when and under what circumstances
parties should be able to control the litigation. In focusing on that
second-order normative question, the existing literature has tended to
obscure the crucial first-order question of whether parties in fact can
exercise dominance over courts and the law.2 1 The answer to that un-
derserved first-order question is primarily grounded in theory.
This Article systematically articulates and defends a formalist
theory of party subordinance, with surprising and potentially contro-
versial repercussions. Part I begins by setting out the model of party
dominance: parties' procedural choices presumptively override con-
trary law and bind the court,22 though the presumption comes with
many exceptions.
Part II upends this orientation by giving form to a more rigid the-
ory of party subordinance, in which parties fall at the bottom of the
power hierarchy. Under this theory, parties' attempts to alter other-
wise applicable procedures-such as through ex ante jury-trial waiv-
19 See infra text accompanying notes 32-48. For an argument advancing the inverse pre-
sumption-that procedural contracts should be presumptively unenforceable-see Marcus,
supra note 10, at 1042-48.
20 For one exception focused on ex ante agreements, see Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 12.
21 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 17, at 452-53 (using normative preferences to bootstrap ques-
tions of power); Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 857 ("[Tjhe fact that parties can vary the rules
of litigation in their ex ante contract is relatively unexplored. .. . This is a rich avenue for future
research . . . ."); see also Marcus, supra note 10, at 981 ("An inquiry into the basic theoretical
plausibility of contract procedure-whether and when procedural rules must yield to contract-
should precede this assumption [that procedural rules can in fact be bargained around]."). Al-
though Professor Marcus appears to recognize this problem, his resolution focuses on the same
private/public-interests bootstrap that others use. Marcus, supra note 10, at 1042-43 (arguing
that procedural contracts should be presumptively unenforceable unless the court determines
that the displaced rule serves purely private interests).
22 See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Mat-
ters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 693 (2012) ("The standard assumption is that [consent, waiver, or]
forfeiture limits the law-declaring authority of the Court in the same way that it binds the liti-
gants."); id. at 680 (acknowledging "the belief that the Court's issue-forfeiture rules (waivers,
stipulations, concessions) bind it as well as the litigants"); see also Marcus, supra note 10, at 981
(asserting that the conventional "assumption [is] that procedural rules can in fact be bargained
around"); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules
of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 579, 618-23 (2007) (arguing
that litigation rules are defaults subject to party control and alteration).
6 [Vol.*83:1
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ers-are wholly unenforceable absent some legal authorization for
judicial enforcement. And even when the law allows parties to exer-
cise litigation choices, courts retain largely unfettered discretion-
cabined only by law-to disregard or override those choices. As a
result, parties in fact have very little formal control over litigation.
Part III excavates the deeper implications of party subordinance.
Subordinance illuminates the nettlesome distinction between ex ante
and ex post party conduct. Although scholars have attempted to find
significance in symmetry between ex post and ex ante permissibility,
subordinance suggests that they have overstated the significance of
the distinction while understating the significance of the law's atten-
tion to the timing of the legal mechanism for implementing party
choice. Subordinance also suggests that the Supreme Court's recent
focus on differences among inadvertent waiver, knowing waiver, for-
feiture, and consent is misplaced. In addition, subordinance shifts a
number of important conversations debating the normative virtues of
the judge as an umpire. Finally, it profoundly affects existing litiga-
tion practice by destabilizing the expected enforcement of privatized
procedure.
Part IV then applies the theory to demonstrate how reoriented
relationships among parties, judges, and the law might inform or alter
various doctrinal areas. In application, party subordinance offers
ways to reconceptualize-and help harmonize-doctrines of personal
jurisdiction, venue, choice of law, and motion practice.
The Article then concludes with some brief reflections on areas
for further exploration.
I. THE MODEL OF PARTY DOMINANCE
Parties today purport to control both law and courts. Although it
was not always so,23 the idea of rights has shifted from a structural
conception to a private good.24 At the same time, the primacy of liti-
gant autonomy has become de rigueur, while the realist appreciation
for procedural efficiency in litigation has become compelling.25 These
23 See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT.
REv. 331, 339-46; cf Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("A man may
not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights... . In a civil case . .. any citizen
may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in
advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.").
24 See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation,
47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 120-21 (1999).
25 Id. at 121-22.
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notions have coalesced around a robust acceptance of the dominance
of party choice.
Under this vision, parties control both the law and the courts. If
parties wish to prescribe their own limitations period in advance, they
can do so by private contract, and, if enforceable, their agreement will
supersede the law. Parties also can control courts by waiving or
forfeiting claims, defenses, facts, arguments, or other issues, which
courts might otherwise raise and decide.
The dominance of party choice, though robust and widespread, is
not inviolate. The most recognizable exception is subject matter juris-
diction.2 6 Although the concept of subject matter jurisdiction has
evolved over the years, it has been accepted for decades that subject
matter jurisdiction, as the "power" of the court, cannot be manufac-
tured by parties through collusion, consent, stipulation, waiver, or for-
feiture.2 7  Federal courts have an independent duty to assure
themselves of subject matter jurisdiction, notwithstanding any party
attempt to waive or consent to jurisdiction.2 8 Either the court has sub-
ject matter jurisdiction or it does not, and, if it does not, party action
cannot create it.29
The exception for subject matter jurisdiction tends to reinforce
the general rule of party control. So ingrained is the inviolate and
exceptional nature of subject matter jurisdiction that the doctrine is
seen as a rare anomaly in an otherwise pervasive landscape of party
power, and it is common for courts to find laws or doctrines to be
resistant to party control only if they have "jurisdictional" status.30
The resulting norm is that, for nonjurisdictional matters, party
26 Miller, supra note 17, at 1280.
27 See Dodson, supra note 3, at 1440-41. Whether parties can stipulate to certain facts
underlying the jurisdictional determination is more complex. See id. at 1466-70.
28 See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982).
29 See Dodson, supra note 3, at 1441. Strictly speaking, this description is an oversimplifi-
cation. Party choices of whom to sue, what claims to assert, the amount of relief to claim, and
what court to file in (or remove to), all can establish or defeat subject-matter jurisdiction. Addi-
tionally, parties can, in limited circumstances, "cure" defects in subject-matter jurisdiction ex
post by, for example, dismissing a nondiverse party from a diversity case when that party's diver-
sity-destroying status has gone unrecognized. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76-78
(1996). These situations, however, do not encompass the kind of party action upon which this
Article focuses.
30 See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007) (focusing on the jurisdictional char-
acterization of a rule to determine its effects). For criticism of this approach, see Scott Dodson,
In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 55, 78 (2008).
8 [Vol. 83:1
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choice-manifested through waiver, forfeiture, consent, and stipula-
tion-controls contrary law, facts, and sua sponte judicial authority.31
Yet even while loosely adhering to the dichotomy between party-
controlled nonjurisdictional rules and party-resistant jurisdictional
rules, courts have developed ad hoc exceptions. For example, courts
have exercised authority to consider issues sua sponte, or to override
party waiver, forfeiture, or stipulation, in certain specific quasi-juris-
dictional circumstances.32 And courts possess a variety of "inherent
powers" to act sua sponte or in contravention of party choice.33 Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has developed a few exceptions in specialized
areas of the law.34 Finally, a number of statutory and rule provisions
31 Consider three cases from just last Term. In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133
S. Ct. 1523 (2013), the Court held that a Fair Labor Standards Act "collective action" case was
not justiciable when the plaintiff's individual claim became mooted by a Rule 68 offer of judg-
ment. Id. at 1528-29. The Court based its assumption on the ground that the plaintiff conceded
the proposition in the lower courts, and on the fact that the plaintiff, as respondent in the Su-
preme Court, failed to cross-petition on the issue. Id. Similarly, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), the Court held that the certification of a class of Comcast subscribers was
improper under Rule 23(b)(3), because the class had not proven that damages were measurable
on a classwide basis through use of a common methodology. Id. at 1433. That holding was
premised on the parties' assumption-highly dubious at best and likely erroneous-that Rule
23(b)(3) requires damages to be measurable on a classwide basis through use of a common
methodology. Id. at 1430. The Court's justification for its reliance on this assumption was sim-
ply that the parties did not contest it. Id. Finally, in Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1830
(2012), the Court held that a court of appeals lacks authority to override a state's deliberate
waiver of AEDPA's limitations defense. For other examples, see Monaghan, supra note 22, at
697-705.
32 See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (ripeness); Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (abstention); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678
(1974) (state sovereign immunity).
33 See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996) (vacating judgments procured by
fraud); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 46-49 (1991) (sanctions); Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (contempt); In re Snyder, 472 U.S.
634, 643 (1985) (disbarment); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
257-59 (1975) (award attorney's fees in limited circumstances); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (inherent power of "courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S.
76, 81 (1950) (inherent power of district courts to set and require case conferences); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert Storage & Transfer Co., 330 U.S. 501, 502 (1947) (forum non conveniens); Ha-
zel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-46 (1944) (stay of proceedings);
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 306-07, 312-14 (1920) (use of nonjudges); Bowen v. Chase, 94
U.S. 812, 824 (1876) (consolidation); Dustin B. Benham, Beyond Congress's Reach: Constitu-
tional Aspects of Inherent Power, 43 SETON HALL L. REv. 75, 94 (2013) (develop an accurate
factual record); Carrie Leonetti, Watching the Hen House: Judicial Rulemaking and Judicial Re-
view, 91 NEB. L. REv. 72, 103 (2012) (control nonjudge courtroom personnel).
34 See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198,205-07 (2006) (habeas limitations); Kontrick
v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 457 n.12 (2004) (certain bankruptcy matters); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S.
431, 441 (2004) (consent decrees); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (preclusion);
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directly authorize trial courts to override party choices at every stage
of a lawsuit, from service of process to judgment, and everything in
between.35
Even beyond particular subjects, inherent powers, and rule au-
thorizations, federal courts act on their own in a variety of more subtle
contexts. For example, courts often independently research and rely
upon arguments, legal authority, and factual authority not cited by
either party.36 The general principle is that "[w]hen an issue or claim
is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular
legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the indepen-
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 136 (1987) (habeas exhaustion); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 662 & n.15 (1978) (certification); Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 845 n.23
(9th Cir. 2003) (qualified immunity); Resnik, supra note 7, at 639 (certain class action issues).
35 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (permitting a court to dismiss a complaint for untimely
service "on its own after notice to the plaintiff"); id. 5(c)(1) (permitting a court to order "on its
own" certain procedures for service of multiple defendants); id. 6(b)(1)(A) (allowing a court to
extend deadlines for good cause "with or without motion"); id. 7(a)(7) (allowing the court to
order a reply to an answer); id. 11(c) (permitting a court to impose sanctions on its own initia-
tive); id. 12(f)(1) (allowing sua sponte orders to strike pleadings); id. 16(c) (empowering the
court to order party attendance at pretrial conferences); id. 19(a) (mandatory joinder); id. 21
(permitting a court to drop or add a party "on its own"); id. 23(e) ("The claims, issues, or de-
fenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the
court's approval."); id. 26(b)(2)(C) (allowing a court to limit discovery "on its own"); id. 29
("Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate that . . . procedures governing or
limiting discovery be modified . . . ."); id. 39(a)(2) (permitting a court to find, "on its own," that
there is no jury-trial right); id. 39(c)(1) (allowing a court to order, sua sponte, any nonjury issue
to be tried with an advisory jury); id. 48(c) (permitting the court to poll jurors "on its own"); id.
56(f)(2) (allowing a court to grant summary judgment "on grounds not raised by a party"); id.
56(f)(3) (allowing a court to "consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the
parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute"); id. 59(d) (permitting a court to
order, "on its own," a new trial under certain circumstances); id. 60(a) (allowing a court to cor-
rect clerical mistakes in a judgment on its own); id. 73(b)(3) (permitting a court to vacate a
consent referral to a magistrate); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210,1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (recog-
nizing that a district court may transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 sua sponte); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012) (specifying circumstances under which a court hearing an in forma
pauperis claim "shall dismiss the case at any time"); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) ("The court shall on
its own motion . . . dismiss any [prisoner] action . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."); HAB. R. 4 (directing a court to dis-
miss a habeas petition sua sponte if it is plain that the petitioner is not entitled to relief).
36 See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511-12 (1994) (instructing lower courts to
take notice of legal authority missed by the parties). On the Supreme Court's practice of devel-
oping (or, perhaps more accurately, undermining) the factual record sua sponte, see generally
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the
Appellate Process, 78 TEx. L. REv. 269 (1999); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court
Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REv. 1255 (2012).
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dent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing
law." 37
To illustrate, the Supreme Court once decided an issue-consid-
ering when punitive damages could be awarded under Title VII-that
was not addressed in the lower courts, was not briefed by the parties,
and was treated as not in dispute by the parties at oral argument.3 8 In
some cases, such as the famous Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,39 the
Court has even overruled controlling precedent sua sponte and with-
out notice to either party.40 The Court's broad "GVR" power-i.e.,
the power to grant, vacate, and remand a case with or without argu-
ment or briefing for further consideration in light of a recent deci-
sion-has been used often even when neither party argued for the
new rule.4 1 And the Court often relies on the positions and arguments
of amici, some of which the Court itself appoints and directs to sup-
port an issue.4 2 The Supreme Court's power to raise forfeited or
waived issues is not limited to cases in which the waiver or forfeiture
has occurred at the Supreme Court; rather, the Court has even raised
and decided issues forfeited in the courts below.43
As these examples demonstrate, an absolutist model of party con-
trol is a fallacy. Instead, party dominance tends to exist as a presump-
37 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991).
38 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 552-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court's penthouse position in the federal judicial structure, in which the judicial law-
pronouncing function is at its zenith, does not entirely explain the Court's practices, for the
Court often-perhaps just as often-defers to party choice. See infra notes 45-46.
39 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
40 Id. at 81-90 (Butler, J., dissenting). Other famous cases decided on grounds not raised
by the parties include Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41 See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court's Controversial GVRs-and
an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711 (2009).
42 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (deciding the case based upon an
argument advanced only by an amicus); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 n.24
(1983) (appointing an amicus to argue a nonjurisdictional point eschewed by both parties). On
the ubiquity and influence of amicus briefs, see generally, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743
(2000); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REv. LrIG. 669 (2008). Sometimes, the
Court at least orders the parties to argue and brief a new issue. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.) (ordering briefing and argument on the new issue
of extraterritorial application); Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (mem.) (directing
the parties to brief whether two controlling cases should be overruled). For a recent discussion,
see Monaghan, supra note 22, at 689-90.
43 See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 255-57 (1981).
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tion, pockmarked by exceptions." This presumption-and-exception
model of party dominance, though quite complex, might be tolerable
if well justified, but courts offer little more than ipse dixit reasoning.45
The most that has been attempted is to cast judicial power to override
party choices as stemming from vague circumstances when structural
concerns predominate, or when the law-pronouncing function of the
courts outweighs their dispute-resolution function.4 6 Commentators
have rightly criticized such distinctions as descriptively porous and
theoretically questionable.47  The paramount problem is that the Su-
preme Court has not articulated a theory governing the relationship
among parties, courts, and the law to resolve or explain both the pre-
sumption and its exceptions.4 8 The best defense to date has been tau-
tological: that the adversary tradition dictates adherence to party
dominance-except when it doesn't.
44 See Frost, supra note 17, at 455-57 (reporting that courts act sua sponte infrequently).
But see Bradley Scott Shannon, Some Concerns About Sua Sponte, 73 OHIo ST. L.J. FURTHER-
MORE 27, 27 (2012) (asserting that "sua sponte decisionmaking has become de rigueur" (footnote
omitted)).
45 See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (following, without justify-
ing, "the principle of party presentation" under which "we rely on the parties to frame the issues
for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present");
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (stating, without justifying, the "general rule ... that
a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below").
46 Some courts appear to except issues of law from party control. See, e.g., United States
v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]here must be enough play in the
joints that the Supreme Court need not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose
nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it-partic-
ularly when the judgment will reinforce error already prevalent in the system."); Estate of San-
ford v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939) ("We are not bound to accept, as
controlling, stipulations as to questions of law."); see also Lawson, supra note 16, at 1209-10
(noting that the norm is that stipulations of law are presumptively invalid while stipulations of
fact-except potentially jurisdictional facts-are presumptively valid). Commentators have ac-
cepted the descriptive view that law pronouncement is routine at the Supreme Court level. See
Monaghan, supra note 22, at 683 (observing that the "Court's law declaration function has long
since assumed overriding importance").
47 See Frost, supra note 17, at 456, 461-69 (characterizing the exceptions to the norm of
party presentation as almost as common as the general norm); Lawson, supra note 16, at 1209-10
(debunking the distinction between issues of law and issues of fact); Miller, supra note 17, at
1286 ("All of these [sua sponte] cases exist side-by-side with the waiver cases. They are hope-
lessly irreconcilable with them."); Shannon, supra note 44, at 32 ("There does not appear to be
anything inherent in the concept of sua sponte decisionmaking that either compels or prevents
its use."); Joan E. Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and
Propriety of Appellate Courts' Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1521, 1525 (2012) (noting a "surprising number" of appellate decisions on questions the trial
court did not decide). Compare Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (stating the "general
rule ... that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below"), with
id. at 121 (announcing "no general rule").
48 See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 22, at 680.
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II. THE THEORY STATED AND DEFENDED
In this Part, I invert this model of party dominance to systemati-
cally articulate, justify, and flesh out a model of party subordinance.
The basic concept of party subordinance is not new, but it has not
been fully articulated, and it is has been obscured by recent trends
toward party dominance. This Part's detailed exegesis of party
subordinance suggests that a model of party subordinance offers both
a more coherent theoretical justification and a simpler, more consis-
tent model than party dominance.
A. Party Subordinance, Legal Dominance
The theory of party subordinance positions party choice at the
bottom of the hierarchy of power, judicial discretion in the middle,
and governing law at the top. Thus, even lawful party choice may be
overridden or disregarded by judicial discretion. And unlawful party
choice is unenforceable. The result is that parties have few opportuni-
ties to customize their litigation, and, even when the law allows them
to do so, courts generally retain discretion to disregard or override
those choices. The following subsections explain the how and why of
each relationship.
1. Party Subordinance to Courts
The theory of party subordinance to courts is grounded primarily
in the public nature of our litigation system and in the governmental
nature of the judiciary. The Constitution envisions public and open
courts composed of neutral judges exercising a governmental power
derived from, and constrained by, the laws governing them.4 9 Courts
in turn create public goods of doctrinal precedent, legal awareness,
and the development and regulation of social norms.50 The public
49 U.S. CONST. art. III.
50 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LE-
GAL S-ruD. 235, 236 (1979); Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REv. 481,
494 (2009); Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: "Open Courts," "Terror Trials," and Public
Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHiCs Hum. Rs. 1, 53-60 (2011); see also Eric D. Miller, Comment,
Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1029, 1048 (1998)
("The adjudication of cases generates precedents and clarifies the law, providing benefits to
everyone in society. The precedent-generating function of courts is inhibited when courts defer
to parties' incorrect statements of the law rather than declare which legal principles in fact gov-
ern the case." (footnotes omitted)).
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substantially subsidizes private litigation in public courts in part to en-
courage production of these public goods.5'
That vision demands that the courts are beholden not to the
whims of individual parties (as the model of party dominance puts it),
which are formally outside of the governmental structure, but to the
legal system as established by a republican society (i.e., the law).52
Courts owe inherent duties to apply (and develop) the law faithfully
and accurately, to resolve cases according to factual truth, and to adju-
dicate in accordance with due process.53 As Judith Resnik has written:
"Courts are not 'servants' of the parties; courts have an independence
from the parties, not only as the voices of other parties' interests, but
as institutions expressive of and accountable to the public."54
It is true that courts serve the private function of dispute resolu-
tion as well,55 and this private function entails consideration of effi-
ciency, economy, and party autonomy.56  But private interests
properly belong in a second-stage inquiry of whether a court should
exercise discretion to enforce lawful party choices, where they can be
taken into consideration fully without doing violence to the public na-
51 Without the subsidy, the cost of litigation could be as much as 5,000 percent higher. See
Tyler, supra note 16, at 1569.
52 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282-84 (1976) (advocating for a model where "the object of litigation is the vindication of
constitutional or statutory policies"); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 535-37 (arguing that
Article III dispute resolution is inherently a governmental function); Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that the role of courts "is not to maximize
the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the
values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those
values and to bring reality into accord with them"); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Jus-
ticiability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 627-28 (1992) (proposing a "public
values" model of adjudication).
53 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-17 (1979);
Resnik, supra note 7, at 623-24.
54 Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471, 1527
(1994); cf Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 181, 207 (calling courts
"important cultural icons").
55 See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Be-
tween Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1275
(1995) ("Almost everyone today would agree that adjudication is about articulating public
norms as well as settling private disputes . . . ."); Lawson, supra note 16, at 1223 ("Our legal
system adopts neither a pure law-declaration model nor a pure dispute-resolution model . . . .");
Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide,
94 GEo. L.J. 121, 138 n.51 (2005) ("[T]here is general agreement that both functions play some
role in adjudication. . . ."). See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,
92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978) (addressing the social tasks properly assigned to the courts).
56 See Lawson, supra note 16, at 1219.
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ture of courts. Private interests have no place in the antecedent in-
quiry of delineating the scope of judicial power. In other words,
courts-not parties-have authority to decide whether party choice
should be enforced. Otherwise, the parties could, by commandeering
the judicial process, force a publicly subsidized court to sacrifice pub-
lic benefits for purely private interests.57  Parties could also force
courts into unique and unfamiliar procedures, elevating the peculiari-
ties of one case over the efficiency of the system as a whole.58 Society
already recognizes private systems beholden to the parties and reflect-
ing the orientation of the model of party dominance-including arbi-
tration, mediation, and private adjudicators-in which parties have
the power to create their own rules and even their own precedent.5 9
The public, governmental nature of the federal courts need not be
sacrificed in light of these alternatives.60
A second feature supporting the theory of party subordinance is
the distinction between rights and remedies. American legal tradition
has long recognized the difference between the rights (both substan-
tive and procedural) provided by the law and the legal mechanisms
(both enabling and limiting) for enforcing them.61 This right-remedy
distinction provides strong theoretical support for party subordinance
in the waiver and forfeiture context. The idea is that waiver, forfei-
ture, and consent may disable parties procedurally from raising the
issues formally in the future, but they do not necessarily extinguish the
underlying right, which the court may still enforce using other appro-
priate mechanisms.62 Put another way, parties can disable themselves
57 See Dodge, supra note 7, at 729 (exploring whether parties should be able to "comman-
deer the public litigation system" from an ex ante procedural perspective); Frost, supra note 17,
at 474 (worrying that private procedure will "transform the federal courts from the third branch
of government responsible for declaring the meaning of law into a private arbitration service
working for the parties and no one else").
58 See Resnik, supra note 7, at 597 (lamenting the erosion of transsubstantivity by "mini-
codes of civil procedure").
59 See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner,
J.) (stating that, generally, "parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the
arbitration of their disputes"). See generally Frank Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. KAN.
L. REV. 281 (2005) (exploring the role of fictitious precedent in private forums of adjudication).
60 A distinct analysis might arise for transnational litigation, in which private ordering
through arbitration could solve some enforcement and jurisdictional problems of public adjudi-
cation. See S.I. Strong, Why is Harmonization of Common Law and Civil Law Procedures Possi-
ble in Arbitration but Not Litigation?, (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 2013-12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2266672.
61 See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (explaining that stat-
utes of limitations generally limit the remedy but not the substantive right).
62 For an inkling of this principle in the context of a recent Supreme Court oral argument
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from using procedural mechanisms to assert an issue, but they cannot
deprive the court of discretion to raise and determine the issue on its
own. Thus, parties retain some authority to limit their future options,
but courts are, in general, not bound by those limitations.
These foundational assumptions of our federal system suggest
that judges are largely independent from party control and retain
broad authority to override party waivers, forfeitures, and stipula-
tions, and to raise issues sua sponte.63 This authority exists even for
the most mundane, private-focused matters, and it is not contingent
upon normative values. Counternorms may counsel self-restraint in
the exercise of such authority, but the point is that the authority exists
largely unfettered by the parties, unless modified by the legislature.
To illustrate, consider the federal statutory requirement that a
state prisoner exhaust prison-condition challenges in the prison griev-
ance process before filing a damages claim in federal court.64 The ex-
haustion requirement is an affirmative defense that can be forfeited if
the state fails to assert the defense in the answer or a pre-answer mo-
tion.65 The purpose of the requirement is to provide "prison officials
an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their re-
sponsibilities before being haled into court," "reduce the number of
inmate suits," and "improve the quality of suits that are filed by pro-
ducing a useful administrative record."6 6 Say, however, the state fails
to file a pre-answer motion and omits the exhaustion defense from its
answer. During the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes obvious
that case adjudication is suffering for lack of a clear and useful admin-
istrative record. Does the state's forfeiture nevertheless disempower
the court from dismissing the lawsuit based on the plaintiff's failure to
exhaust?
No. The forfeiture limits the state's procedural mechanisms for
asserting the defense in the litigation, for example, by preventing the
defendant from being able to move to dismiss on exhaustion grounds
on the effect of a waiver of a limitations defense, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-32,
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (No. 10-9995). Justice Scalia asked, "You say you didn't
abandon the right. . . . You just gave up the-the opportunity to raise it yourself." Id. at 30.
Justice Breyer asked, "[H]e did abandon his right, the State, to push the matter.... He didn't
abandon the right to get the case dismissed if the judge pursues it." Id. at 31-32.
63 See Frost, supra note 17, at 509-10 (arguing that sua sponte authority helps protect the
public function of courts).
64 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison condi-
tions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.").
65 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), 12(b); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211-12 (2007).
66 See Jones, 549 U.S. at 204.
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under Rule 12(b).67 But extinguishing that procedural right does not
mean that exhaustion is no longer implicated. It just means that the
state no longer can assert he exhaustion defense in a particular way.
Indeed, it is possible that the state could move to amend its answer to
assert the defense and then seek a Rule 12(c) judgment on exhaustion
grounds.68 Consequently, the exhaustion requirement still applies to
the claim. And neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor any
statutory command disables the court from overlooking the state's
forfeiture. Accordingly, the court has the power to exercise discretion
to raise the defense on its own and dismiss the case on exhaustion
grounds. Perhaps sound discretion counsels against overriding the
state's forfeiture in such a case. But the court has the power to do so.
2. Party Subordinance to the Law
If parties exert no inherent control over judicial authority, then
they also exert no inherent control over the law.69 Consider, for ex-
ample, a three-year federal statute of limitations, which is invoked
through timely assertion as a defense.70 As explained above, the de-
fendant's forfeiture of the right to assert the defense does not sud-
denly make the lawsuit timely; rather, the forfeiture just extinguishes
the defendant's ability to assert what might be a valid defense to the
claim.7 ' The judge retains the power to dismiss the case based on the
limitations bar, because the bar still exists; the defendant just cannot
invoke it. The parties have not changed the law at all; they have
merely operated within the scope of what the law already allows.
The same principles extend to an attempt by the parties to change
the limitations period to something other than three years.7 2 Say the
parties previously entered into an agreement that any limitations pe-
67 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("A motion asserting any of these defenses must be made
before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.").
68 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c), 15(a).
69 This principle is represented ambivalently in current doctrine. Compare, e.g., Hall St.
Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding parties unable to alter the review provi-
sions of the Federal Arbitration Act), with, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430
(2013) (deciding a class-certification issue according to the parties' dubious stipulation as to the
law).
70 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (listing statute of limitations as an affirmative defense).
71 Of course, the law could be written to create such a scenario, for example, by retroac-
tively making untimely claims timely upon a defendant's forfeiture, but let us assume that the
statute of limitations here does not. The next Subpart addresses the law's incorporation of party
choice. See infra Part II.A.3.
72 Again, the statute could be written to expressly incorporate changes made by the par-
ties, but assume that this statute of limitations does not.
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riod applicable to the lawsuit would be four years, and the plaintiff's
claim is timely under the agreement but untimely under the statute.73
The parties' agreement o more changes the law than binds the court.
If the defendant moves to dismiss on timeliness grounds, then the
court must decide the motion under the legal limitations period, not
the parties' agreement. Perhaps the plaintiff now has a breach of con-
tract claim against the defendant, but the governing statute of limita-
tions remains unaffected. The finer point is that the parties cannot
change the limitations law by private agreement.
The private agreement effectively was a promise by the parties to
not move to dismiss any lawsuit on limitations grounds unless the law-
suit was filed more than four years after the limitations period began
to run. Nothing prevents parties from contractually committing them-
selves ex ante to that ex post conduct. The law usually permits parties
to waive or forfeit limitations defenses ex post, and it is the defen-
dant's prerogative to do so if it wishes.7 4 An ex ante agreement may
bind (at least as a matter of contract law) the defendant to a particular
ex post litigation choice. It does not, however, bind the court, and if
the defendant breaches the agreement by moving to dismiss in a man-
ner prohibited by the contract,75 the court should adjudicate the mo-
tion according to the law, not according to the contract.76
Now assume that the parties instead agreed to a two-year limita-
tions period.77 The plaintiff files within the statutory period but
outside the contractual period. The defendant moves to dismiss based
on untimeliness. The court should deny the motion. Think about it:
what law authorizes such a dismissal? The law deems the claim
timely, and the contract neither changes the law nor binds the court,
so no authorization for dismissal exists. Perhaps the defendant now
has a breach of contract claim against the plaintiff for pursuing a claim
prohibited by contract, but the parties' agreement does not affect the
73 Professor Bone sees this kind of ex ante choice as available ex post, a category he calls
"Type II," and thinks that Type II agreements generally should be enforceable. See Bone, supra
note 9, at 1348, 1383. For a similar take stemming from the parallelism of ex post permissive-
ness, see Dodge, supra note 7.
74 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), 12(b).
75 Nothing in the Federal Rules bars the defendant from making such a motion in contra-
vention of its ex ante commitments. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (setting out when motions to dismiss
may be made but omitting any prohibition on motions based on ex ante agreements).
76 If the law itself allows modification by the parties or empowers parties to bind the court,
then a different result follows. The next Subpart explores this. See infra Part II.A.3.
77 Professor Bone sees this kind of ex ante agreement as generally unavailable ex post, a
category he calls "Type III," and finds the case for enforcement of Type III agreements less
clear. See Bone, supra note 9, at 1348, 1383.
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law governing the original lawsuit. The point is that parties have con-
trol over their own conduct, but they do not have formal control over
either the courts or the law.
Importantly, courts have no discretion to enforce party choice
over unyielding contrary law. Judicial authority is just as subordinate
to the law as party choice is. An agreement contrary to law is both
ineffective in attempting to override the law and unenforceable by the
court. If the defendant makes a proper motion, the court must decide
the motion under the law and has no discretion to enforce a contractu-
ally different result. Otherwise, the court would elevate parties from a
position of subordinance to a position of dominance.
A lawful party choice naturally stands on different footing. A
party choice allowed by law-such as most ex post forfeitures and
waivers-is effective against the parties: parties may disable them-
selves from certain future action.78 But party choice is subordinate to
judicial authority and thus cannot disable courts.7 9 Courts therefore
have discretion to override lawful party choices, even while they lack
discretion to enforce unlawful party choices.
3. The Law's Dominance
Parties are subordinate to both the law and judicial authority.
But judicial authority is subordinate to the law. The law, therefore, as
the apex of power, can enable party conduct to limit judicial authority.
The theory of party subordinance thus needs a qualification: parties
are subordinate unless the law empowers or allows party dominance.80
The need for that condition begins with the premise that, unlike
parties, who are outside of the governmental structure, the Constitu-
tion and congressional acts can and do limit judicial power. For exam-
ple, because the Constitution vests judicial power only over cases and
controversies, a federal court may not issue an advisory opinion.81
Whether an opinion is advisory often depends upon the parties' re-
spective positions and offerings. For my purposes, this prohibition on
advisory opinions means that the parties may remove certain issues
from judicial consideration by refusing to press or contest them.82 For
78 See FiED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), 12(b).
79 See supra Part H.A.1.
80 This concept is akin to one hinted at in Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 534-37
(where the authors contend that legal dispute resolution can be outsourced to the parties only
upon a delegation of governmental authority to them), and derives from a strong form of legal
positivism.
81 U.S. CONsr. art. Ill, § 2.
82 See KARL N. LLwEuwLLYN, Ti-E COMMON LAW TRADIION: DECIDING APPEALS 3-7,
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example, the issuance of a binding covenant not to sue a particular
competitor for trademark infringement moots the competitor's claim
that the trademark is invalid.83 Party conduct can change the nature
of the case under Article III such that a court would exceed constitu-
tional limits by disregarding that conduct. Put another way, the con-
stitutional case-or-controversy requirement empowers certain party
choices to control judicial authority. As I will explain in the next Sub-
part, however, this empowerment is relatively rare and quite narrow.
In a similar vein, Congress, through its powers to "ordain and
establish" lower courts,8 4 to regulate the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction,85 and to make laws that are "necessary and proper" to
effectuate these powers,86 can limit judicial power as well,8 7 and noth-
ing prevents Congress generally from using certain party choices or
conduct to trigger binding statutory limits. In effect, the law's domi-
nance over courts includes the law's capacity to make party conduct
binding upon courts.
Congress's power to give party choice-for my purposes, waiver,
forfeiture, and stipulation-control over judicial authority is not un-
fettered, of course. Law has its own hierarchy. Constitutional princi-
ples of separation of powers, for example, limit congressional
abridgment of inherent judicial powers.88 And the Constitution for-
29-33 (1960) (comparing sua sponte decisionmaking and advisory opinionmaking); cf JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 21-53 (1977) (arguing that the
prohibition on advisory opinions undermines the authority of the Court to create prospective
rules of procedure); Lawson, supra note 16, at 1222 (arguing that a pure system of law declara-
tion would dispense with parties, cases, and real facts entirely). This limitation is related to the
idea of dictum. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv.
953 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 111, 142 U. PA. L. Riy. 1997, 1997-98 (1994).
83 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 728-29 (2013).
84 U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1.
85 U.S. CONs'r. art. 111, § 2.
86 U.S. CONs'. art. I, § 8.
87 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1825).
88 Although few doubt the existence of some judicial prerogative in the rulemaking arena,
its extent and character is richly debated. For classic positions in the debate, compare Roscoe
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926), which argues that
the courts should control procedure, and John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary
Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 276-79 (1928), which argues the same,
with Charles E. Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28
A.B.A. J. 521, 521-23 (1942), which notes that Congress is supreme on legislative rulemaking.
For a smattering of important later contributions to the conversation, see, for example, FELIx F.
STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY 18-19
(1994), Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legiti-
macy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 909 (1999), Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure,
Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677, 1687-88 (2004), A.
Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Prob-
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bids Congress from limiting judicial powers in a way that results in the
forced adjudication of a case that exceeds the grant of judicial power
in Article 111.89 Congress may not do through parties what it cannot
do directly. But, outside of constitutional constraints, Congress can
empower party choice to control judicial authority.
Conventional wisdom (though not uniformly embraced)90 holds
that rules of court, adopted under the Rules Enabling Act,91 have the
same force as statutes in these contexts. The Rules Enabling Act, duly
passed by Congress, essentially delegates much of the rulemaking au-
thority to the Supreme Court, subject to congressional veto.92 The re-
sulting rules then constrain court power as much as statutes do. For
example, the deadline to file a new-trial motion is twenty-eight days,93
and courts have no authority to extend the deadline or excuse its non-
compliance.94 For purposes of this Article, I remain agnostic on the
details of parity between statutes and court rules; it is sufficient to
show that Congress can delegate to the rulemaking process some of its
court-constraining power.95
In addition to law's ability to alter the normal order of party
subordinance to judicial authority, law also can allow itself to be af-
lem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958), Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power
and the Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. REv. 733 (1995), Martin H. Redish & Umu M. Amuluru,
The Supreme Court, The Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Consti-
tutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1306-07 (2006), and Stephen C.
Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 229 (1998).
89 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-61 (1911) (holding Article III's contro-
versy requirement to limit Congress's ability to allow parties to manufacture a case).
90 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JuoIcIAL POWER 20-22 (2d ed. 1990) (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act is an unconstitu-
tional delegation of rulemaking).
91 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2012).
92 See id. § 2072(a) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . .
and courts of appeals."). Congress has authorized, and the Supreme Court has adopted, rules
further delegating local rulemaking authority to the lower courts. See id. § 2071 (a) ("The Su-
preme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules
for the conduct of their business."); FFu. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1) ("Each district court acting by a
majority of its district judges may, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to
comment, make and amend rules governing its practice."); FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (authorizing the
promulgation of local rules). For the seminal treatment of the Rules Enabling Act, see generally
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) ("A court must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and
(d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).").
95 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-50 (1825). For commentary on the
relationship between inherent power and court rules, see generally Samuel P. Jordan, Situating
Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 311 (2010).
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fected by party choice. For example, the statute of limitations in the
examples above could specifically allow party agreements to enlarge
or restrict the time period. In that case, party choice actually changes
the legal rule, such that a court then would be bound to enforce it.
Such laws are rare, but they do exist. For example, Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the parties to stipulate to the
time, place, and manner of depositions and to other customized proce-
dures governing and limiting discovery, and those stipulations operate
as law that a court may enforce, notwithstanding contrary discovery
procedures set out in the Federal Rules.96 In these situations, how-
ever, the parties have not exerted dominance over the law; rather, the
law allows itself to be influenced by party agreement. The crucial
point is this: parties exercise control over the law only to the extent
the law expressly allows them to.
This feature of law's dominance-its ability to allow party con-
duct to affect its own contours-cycles back to influence judicial au-
thority in various ways, depending upon how the law's allowance is
structured. Normally, law's dominance will circumscribe judicial au-
thority. Because ex ante party contracts neither bind the court nor
change the law (except as the law allows itself to be changed), a judge
not only is not bound by an ex ante agreement o alter the applicable
limitations period (because of party subordinance to judicial author-
ity) but also is powerless to exercise discretion to abide by the parties'
contractual wishes. Thus, any second-stage discretionary analysis al-
lowed by judicial authority's dominance over party choice is limited
by the law's dominance over judicial authority. If the law applies a
three-year limitations period, and the law does not incorporate party
modifications, then the court has no discretion to take those party
modifications into account when ruling on a proper motion to dismiss
based on the applicable limitations periods. In such a case, the party
choice is both ineffective and unenforceable.97
96 FiED. R. Civ. P. 29 ("Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate that:
(a) a deposition may be taken before any person, at any time or place, on any notice, and in the
manner specified-in which event it may be used in the same way as any other deposition; and
(b) other procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified . . . ."); see also id. 1970 advi-
sory committee's note ("It is common practice for parties to agree on [discovery] variations, and
the amendment recognizes such agreements and provides a formal mechanism in the rules for
giving them effect."). Even this specific authorization, however, lodges residual discretion in the
judge to require preapproval of such stipulations or to override them after the fact by court
order. Id. ("Any stipulation varying the procedures may be superseded by court order .... ); id.
1993 advisory committee's note ("By order or local rule, the court can, however, direct that its
approval be obtained for particular types of stipulations . . . .").
97 The rigidity of this model separates it from the presumption-and-exception model of
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Of course, the law could authorize court discretion in deciding
whether to alter the limitations period based upon the parties' ex ante
agreements. For example, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure grants judges broad managerial powers to structure pretrial lit-
igation, including, among others, the power to "modify the extent of
discovery."98 If the parties agree to conduct just two depositions each,
the stipulation itself would not bind the court, but it can-and
should-be a factor in the judge's discretion to issue an order limiting
depositions to two per side. The resulting order would then legally
bind the parties and serve as a legal basis for future court action in the
event of noncompliance. To be clear, law is still dominant, and party
choice has not overridden the law. Rather, the law can allow party
choice-here, through the grant of judicial discretion-to alter the ap-
plicable legal rule. Again, the idea is that parties control legal rules
only to the extent the law itself allows such control.
Importantly, when the law does not allow such control, law-con-
travening agreements are unenforceable. But that unenforceability
does not render them completely irrelevant. Consider, for example,
an attempt by the parties to change a three-year limitations period to
four years. The plaintiff files suit three-and-a-half years after the
claim accrued. As discussed above, the defendant could invoke the
three-year limitations defense established by law despite the contrac-
tual four-year period, and, if the defendant does so properly, the court
would have to find the action barred. But what if the defendant fails
to assert the defense? Recall that the defendant's forfeiture does not
render the action timely, just as the parties' agreement does not
render the action timely. Because parties are subordinate to courts, a
court could override the defendant's forfeiture and invoke the limita-
tions defense sua sponte. But I expect that the parties' contractual
agreement to lengthen the limitations period-though unenforce-
able-would nevertheless weigh heavily against any judicial decision
to override the defendant's forfeiture.
The illustrations above feature limitations periods and discovery
procedures, but the same reasoning applies to a host of other kinds of
typical ex ante agreements, including jury-trial waivers, class-action
waivers, punitive-damage waivers, and forum-selection clauses. Pri-
others who wish to see courts retain some discretion over enforcement of party choice. See, e.g.,
Marcus, supra note 10, at 1042-43. For an important exploration of the ways substantive law
might encourage or discourage judicial procedural discretion, see generally Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027 (2013).
98 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).
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vate contracts attempting to alter these legal rules may bind the par-
ties under penalty of a lawsuit for breach of contract. But they do not
change the law governing the substantive lawsuit. And if a plaintiff
files a complaint in a court that is proper under the law but improper
under the contract (such as by properly demanding a jury trial despite
a contractual waiver of that right, or by seeking punitive damages de-
spite a release of punitive-damage liability), the court should-indeed,
must-follow the law, not the contract. Part III further addresses
some of these kinds of contractual provisions.
4. An Example: The Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 99 illustrates these princi-
ples. The FAA expressly subordinates judicial power to party agree-
ments to arbitrate. Section 2 of the Act provides that a written
arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."100 Had Congress ended here, it might be an open
question how a court should enforce arbitration agreements; without a
specified mechanism, the default enforcement might only be via law-
suit for breach of contract. But Congress went further in Section 4 to
provide a specific enforcement mechanism:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitra-
tion may petition any United States district court . .. for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in writing
of such application shall be served upon the party in default.
Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.10'
Thus, Congress, through the FAA, has specifically provided a
mechanism for the judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements
that, in effect, allows party choice to circumscribe judicial power.102
99 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
too Id. § 2.
101 Id. § 4.
102 Ironically, the widespread judicial practice of party deference infects even arbitration
cases in which party choices are not controlled by the FAA. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC
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The FAA, then, teaches two things. First, it illustrates, by
counterexample, the principle of party subordinance in most litiga-
tion-based contractual provisions. Unlike arbitration provisions gov-
erned by the FAA, most party agreements have no special force and
entail no special reaction. They neither change the law nor circum-
scribe judicial power. They are relegated to the discretion of the court
or enforcement through the normal channel of a formal claim for
breach of contract.
Second, the FAA shows the power of law's dominance by demon-
strating that Congress can, when it wishes, alter the usual hierarchy to
subjugate judicial power to party choice. It is worth noting that Con-
gress's decision to do so with the FAA has not been overlooked. In a
series of opinions over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has
implemented the FAA's language, repeatedly recognizing a special
federal law of arbitration largely controlled by party choice.103
B. Objections to Party Subordinance
In this Subpart, I consider five possible objections to a theory of
party subordinance.
The first is constitutional-that Article III's requirement of a case
or controversy, and correlative prohibition on advisory opinions, re-
quires deference to party wishes. I acknowledged this as an important
example of law's dominance above. But does this constitutional con-
straint, which limits the power of a court to reach out to decide an
issue that neither party presses or contests, deprive party
subordinance of any meaningful doctrinal space?104
The answer is no. The reason is that the scope of law's domi-
nance under the case-or-controversy requirement is quite narrow. Be-
cause the mandate of Article III is case-focused, not issue-focused, the
Constitution requires party conduct to do one of two things to control
judicial discretion: dispose entirely of the whole case or remove an
issue from any relevance to the case. For example, in Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,1 0 5 the Court held that a set-
tlement-based stipulation of dismissal, entered by the court without
v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013) (applying a deferential standard of review to an arbitra-
tor's construction of an arbitration agreement only because the parties stipulated that the agree-
ment delegated such authority to the arbitrator).
103 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (uphold-
ing an arbitration provision that precluded class action treatment of claims with significant public
dimension even if those claims would have been economically infeasible to pursue individually).
104 See supra note 82.
105 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
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reservation of jurisdiction, could not serve as an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction to hear a later lawsuit based on an alleged breach
of the settlement terms.10 6 No other sua sponte issues should impli-
cate Article III's case-or-controversy requirement.107 Indeed, the
Court just last Term in United States v. Windsor08 held that the United
States, a losing party to the final judgment, had standing to appeal
even though it agreed with the correctness of the judgment.109 The
reality is that although party conduct can trigger Article III limits on
court power, party choices rarely do so.
Further, the case-or-controversy requirement is a fickle one, for it
also supports the theory of party subordinance by demanding judicial
intervention when the parties' choices would force an otherwise defer-
ential court to decide cases outside Article III. This scenario could
occur on either the law or the facts. For example, in United States
National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America,
Inc.,110 the Supreme Court allowed the D.C. Circuit to decide a legal
issue not raised by the parties, because "the contrary conclusion
would permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue presented, to
extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or
dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be difficult to
characterize as anything but advisory.""' Analogously, in Swift & Co.
v. Hocking Valley Railway Co.,112 the Court refused to accept a stipu-
lation of fact that was contrary to the record, because, in the Court's
view, accepting the stipulation would present a hypothetical case.1 3
Thus, the case-or-controversy requirement is not a one-way ratchet
against party subordinance. Rather, it can demand judicial override
of party conduct when that party conduct manufactures a hypothetical
dispute. The Article III objection, therefore, is a narrowly applicable
106 Id. at 381-82.
107 Cf Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he re-
fusal to consider arguments not raised is [not] a statutory or constitutional mandate. . . ."); Frost,
supra note 17, at 460 ("[CJourts are not constitutionally barred from raising new issues."). For
an example of a decision of the Court resolving an issue in a way approaching an advisory opin-
ion, see Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58-59 (1999) (finding no state action to
allow a § 1983 claim but nevertheless proceeding, as if state action had been found, to decide
also the constitutionality of the conduct at issue).
108 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
109 See id. at 2684-86.
110 U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
111 Id. at 447.
112 Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281 (1917).
113 Id. at 285-89. Gary Lawson reads Swift as a nonjurisdictional decision. Lawson, supra
note 16, at 1206-07.
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one already incorporated by the condition that parties cannot limit
judicial authority unless the law so provides. This objection need not
swallow the theory, but rather need only be located within it.
The second objection is Fullerian: that party subordinance, even
if not prohibited by the Constitution, undermines the prudentially de-
sirable benefits of deferential judicial passivity. Passivity's virtues are
well known: it safeguards the judicial-adjudicative function and avoids
quasi-legislative decisionmaking,114 helps preserve the appearance of
judicial neutrality,15 ensures compliance with the notice-and-opportu-
nity feature of due process,1 16 improves the accuracy of judicial deci-
sionmaking by involving party arguments,117 relieves judges from the
burdens of developing the record and framing the case on their
own,"r8 avoids upsetting the reasonable expectations of litigants, po-
tentially improves the efficiency of litigation by tailoring procedure to
the needs of the case,119 protects parties from the expense of having to
litigate issues at the insistence of the court,'12 0 dissuades parties from
sandbagging each other and courts,'121 incentivizes representational
quality,122 and potentially improves party and public acceptance of the
judge's decision.123
114 See Fuller, supra note 55, at 381-82.
115 LANDSMAN, supra note 17, at 2; cf H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 4-5 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6354-55 (lauding an objective standard for judicial recusal as a way "to
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process").
116 See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918) (setting out the
notice-and-opportunity feature of due process); Milani & Smith, supra note 17, at 267-68 (recog-
nizing due process concerns with sua sponte decisionmaking).
117 See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); LANDSMAN, supra note 17, at 38-39;
see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 104, at 325 (asserting that judges and neutral experts cannot
advance party interests as zealously as parties themselves).
118 See Frost, supra note 17, at 506 ("Judges ... lack the institutional capacity to frame cases
themselves. Judges do not have the staff or funds to personally investigate the facts of the cases
that come before them, nor do they share the parties' incentives to uncover all the information
that could assist them in making their case.").
119 See Lawson, supra note 16, at 1203; Rhee, supra note 9, at 516-17; Scott & Triantis,
supra note 16, at 856.
120 I thank Evan Lee for pressing this point.
121 See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393-98 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (worrying that parties might try to sandbag the court or adversaries by revisiting issues
seriatim, or after the other party has ceased investigation).
122 Hartmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (7th Cir. 1993) (Poster,
J.) ("[W]e cannot have a rule that in a sympathetic case an appellant can serve us up a muddle in
the hope that we or our law clerks will find somewhere in it a reversible error.").
123 See LANDSMAN, supra note 17, at 33-34; THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS
AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 121-22 (1978) (report-
ing that litigants can feel unfairly treated if the judge resolves an issue not raised by the parties);
Moffitt, supra note 17, at 464, 479-91 (arguing that customization can enhance procedural justice
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There often are two sides to everything, and, here, each passivity
benefit has its concomitant detraction. Some quasi-legislative deci-
sionmaking is necessary in the federal judicial system, and it occurs
constantly at the appellate level whenever a court announces a rule
that applies beyond the peculiar factual circumstances of the particu-
lar case. At times, judicial intervention enhances, rather than erodes,
the appearance of neutrality, especially when nonparty rights are at
stake.124 Accuracy, too, cuts both ways, such as if parties fail to cite
proper precedent or otherwise create an artificially closed universe of
fact and law for the court to consider.125 Efficiency can be reversed if
the tailored procedures are confusing or are drafted early under ex-
pectations that do not materialize later in the litigation. The judicial
burdens of going beyond party framing may not be particularly heavy,
particularly when the record or law is clearly contrary to the parties'
positions.126 Party expectations are not often justifiable,' 27 and even
when they may be important, so are judicial expectations of the immu-
tability of the rules the court will follow.1 28 Protecting parties from
being commandeered by the court to litigate an issue neither wishes to
pursue is no more important than protecting the court from being
commandeered by the parties to decide a manufactured issue under
questionable law, fact, or process. And the notice-and-opportunity
principle of due process is both widely ignored in judicial decision-
making on small levels (such as the entrenched practice of original
judicial opinion writing rather than wholesale adoption of one party's
argument) and easily satisfied in more troublesome cases (such as by
actually giving notice and an opportunity for briefing before ruling sua
and the public perception of litigation); Oldfather, supra note 55, at 139-42 (arguing that the
loser's acceptance is enhanced by the perception of fair process). For the seminal treatment of
"procedural justice," particularly as enhanced by adversarial representation, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 273-312 (2004).
124 See Fiss, supra note 53, at 25-26 (worrying that a court could "be led into error" by the
parties and to the detriment of nonparties).
125 See Hartmann, 9 F.3d at 1214-15 (suggesting that sua sponte consideration may be in
order "where a court decides to reexamine a precedent so deeply entrenched in the law that a
litigant might not think to challenge it").
126 Cf Frost, supra note 17, at 507 ("The point here is only that when judges do stumble
upon a new legal claim, source of law, or line of reasoning, they should not be discouraged from
noting that issue and asking the parties to address it.").
127 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CAR-
Dozo L. Rav. 1961, 2015 & nn.215-16 (2007).
128 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Asser-
tions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2067, 2068-69 (1989).
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sponte or overriding party choice).129 Further, extreme party defer-
ence can sacrifice third-party rightso30 and public and systemic val-
ues,131 and erode both the public perception of the judiciary 32 and its
normative legitimacy.33 Strategic sandbagging and truly poor lawyer-
ing ought to be problematic only in the unusual case in which the
likely marginal advantage gained from potential future judicial inter-
vention outweighs the risk of losing the issue entirely,134 and, in any
case, judicial intervention for truly poor lawyering might be norma-
tively desirable on balance, especially for pro se litigants or disadvan-
taged parties,'3 5 while strategic gaming might be even more frequent
under a regime of extreme deference to parties.36 Party acceptance
may be eroded rather than supported if erroneous waivers or forfeit-
ures are enforced without consideration of the circumstances.3 7
These competing values cannot be resolved satisfactorily through
a model of absolute party dominance. To do so would elevate the
129 Rule 56(f), for example, requires judges to give the parties "notice and a reasonable
time to respond" before entering summary judgment sua sponte. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f). For
analogous arguments that sua sponte issue-raising by appellate courts should be accompanied by
notice-and-opportunity allowances, see Milani & Smith, supra note 17, at 268; Miller, supra note
17, at 1290; Steinman, supra note 47, at 1534-35.
130 See Bone, supra note 9, at 1372; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 543.
131 See Frost, supra note 17, at 479.
132 See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 547-48.
133 See Bone, supra note 9, at 1384.
134 See Frost, supra note 17, at 508 (surmising that the concern "that judicial issue creation
might diminish lawyers' incentives to locate all of the best arguments ... seems farfetched"); see
also Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on
Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985, 989 (1989) (surmising that parties would not facilely eschew winning
arguments).
135 See Frost, supra note 17, at 501 ("The judge can make the adversary system more effi-
cient at reaching just and accurate outcomes by helping to right the imbalance in opposing law-
yers' skills and resources."); see also Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) ("Rules of
practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them. A rigid
and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review would invariably and
under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifi-
cally urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require
sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice.").
136 Cause lawyering, in particular, is multicase strategic and often involves manipulation of
the issues in the case. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage:
Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
1493 (2006) (exploring gay marriage proponents' lawyering strategies); see also Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the pro-choice groups did not
press a Commerce Clause challenge to the partial-birth abortion ban); RICHARD KLUGER, SIM-
PLE JUSTICE: THE HIsToRY OF Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for
Equality (1975) (documenting the NAACP's conspicuous refusal to press for desegregation at
the Court until Brown).
137 See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557.
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Fullerian vision to an extreme and ignore its downsides; the virtues of
party control, though powerful, cannot justify court subjugation to
party whim in all circumstances. A more faint-hearted model of party
dominance-developing a rule with exceptions dependent upon the
many context-specific and competing values-would be extraordina-
rily difficult, complex, and perhaps even self-defeating. Consider the
following. At trial, the plaintiff introduces hearsay evidence. The de-
fendant fails to object, and the trial judge admits the evidence. The
evidence is crucial in the ultimate jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendant appeals, claiming the evidentiary admission was erro-
neous because the evidence was hearsay. The plaintiff opposes the
defendant's argument only on the ground that the evidence fell within
a hearsay exception. The plaintiff does not argue that the defendant
waived its right to challenge the admission on appeal because the de-
fendant failed to object at trial. The Court of Appeals disagrees with
the plaintiff on the question of whether the evidence was inadmissible
hearsay, but it believes that the contemporaneous-objection rule
should preclude the defendant from arguing the ground on appeal.
What should the court do? Should it affirm based on the original
waiver-that the defendant forfeited its right to challenge the admis-
sion on appeal? Or should it reverse based on the plaintiff's forfeiture
of the waiver issue? Do two waivers make a right?138
Things need not be so hard. A model of party subordinance can
incorporate the virtues of party control in a second-order discretion-
ary decision by the court of whether to exercise its power to ignore or
override lawful party choices. Locating the virtues of party choice in
this second-order position allows courts to weigh them against their
detractions in the context of a particular case. That second-order dis-
cretion is clearly necessary and important; I expect that judges will
often-perhaps most often-defer to lawful party choices based on
the virtues of the Fullerian model.139
Such a second-order discretionary power does risk a complicated
and burdensome balancing act for each party choice. But in some
cases, the discretionary task should be fairly easy, and in others,
judges already comfortable with legal standards that depend upon
138 Cf FED. R. EVID. 103 (disabling parties, but not the court, from raising forfeited evi-
dence objections); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 815-16 (1985) (addressing the
propriety of a jury instruction, despite the petitioner's failure to timely object to the instruction,
because the respondent did not timely object to the petitioner's untimely objection).
139 But see Shannon, supra note 44, at 35-36 (imagining a world of limited judicial defer-
ence). I note that the Constitution may restrict the discretion of the court to follow party choice
if the party choices so affect the court as an institution.
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competing values ought to find themselves fairly equipped to the task.
The end result is that the model of party subordinance largely incor-
porates due consideration of the virtues of litigant choice. It does so
at the discretion of the courts rather than at the insistence of the par-
ties, but, in a public court system, that is as it should be.
A third objection is that the theory of party subordination relies
on a backward interpretation of congressional silence. If Congress
controls the courts, then some may assume, perhaps premised on a
conceptualization of federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction and
powers, that courts lack the power to intervene absent affirmative au-
thorization.140 In other words, I'm right that the law is dominant, but
I'm wrong that parties are subordinate to courts. Instead, the default
should be judicial subordination to party choice unless the law pro-
vides otherwise.
But the idea of limited federal power is relative to other govern-
mental actors, not private parties, and it would be quite odd to have
parties control federal courts-even federal courts with limited pow-
ers. Further, such an objection ignores the long history of equitable
prerogatives of the courts, the public nature of courts and their fidelity
to the law, the myriad instances in which courts have acted sua sponte
or have overridden party choices, and the strong trend among federal
rulemaking bodies to grant more and more discretion to district
judges.141 Given these premises, Congress's silence ought to be con-
strued as an acceptance of a default party subordinance rather than an
acceptance of a default judicial subordinance.
A fourth objection is that party subordinance gives too much dis-
cretionary power to courts and creates too much risk that courts will
wield that discretionary power in biased or arbitrary ways. Party
dominance over court discretion, the objection might go, is necessary
to check judicial power. This objection strikes me as a legitimate con-
cern, if it could be shown empirically to be true. But the party
subordinance theory already incorporates two safeguards that ought
to minimize the force of this objection. The first is that the second-
order discretionary inquiry relies upon recognizable criteria to inform
judges, and the scholarship in this area offers promising ways to guide
140 Cf, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738-41 (2001) (making a similar argument against the use of
merely "beneficial" inherent powers).
141 See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NorRE DAME L. REv. 1561
(2003).
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the exercise of court discretion.14 2 It is not clear that this area risks
any more arbitrariness or bias than any other of the numerous doc-
trines that require the exercise of judicial discretion or the weighing of
competing values.143 But even if it does present such a risk in particu-
lar areas, the second safeguard is law's dominance, which allows Con-
gress to step in to empower parties to control courts in specific areas
in which judicial discretion is shown to be muddled or ineffective.
A fifth objection is that party subordinance essentially reduces
party choice to a nullity, depriving parties of too much autonomy and
certainty in litigation. To this objection I offer three responses. The
first is that although party subordinance means that party choice can-
not control the law or judges, party choice may still control parties.
Ex post litigation conduct-waiver, forfeiture, consent, and stipula-
tion-can impose real constraints on future litigation conduct. As just
a routine example, a party's failure to object contemporaneously to
the authenticity of evidence may prevent her from raising questions of
that authenticity later.'" True, the court is not bound and may be able
to resurrect the issue, but in a system that still relies heavily on party
initiative, disabling parties' future choices can be significant.145 And
party-based consequence can be valuable to litigants in promoting
their zealous representation through signaling, streamlining, or strate-
gic dealing. I seriously doubt that the small risk of judicial interven-
tion will dissuade current party-driven practices in discovery and trial.
For ex ante agreements, parties' certainties are as reliable as any other
contractual relationship in which breach is difficult to remedy or in
which external factors (here, the court's power to disregard ex post
party conduct) may reduce the expected value and certainty of the
agreement. The second response is that the court always has discre-
tion to defer to lawful party choices, and detrimental party reliance is
a factor for courts to consider. As a result, courts are likely to be
disinclined to disturb lawful and routine party choices and expecta-
tions. The third response is, again, that Congress is the ultimate back-
stop against judicial power and can legislate, using law's dominance,
to enable party choice to control courts.
142 For a seminal treatment of discretion, see Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discre-
tion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
143 See generally id.
144 See FED. R. EVID. 103.
145 Contrast this reliance on party initiative with the more active leadership role of civil-law
judges in developing and directing the evidence. See generally Scott Dodson & James M.
Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 1, 9-11 (2011).
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C. Countertheories Considered
I turn now to potential alternative theories of the hierarchy
among parties, the court, and the law-each offering parties more
dominance.
One countertheory is contractual. The idea is that the parties, by
their actions, have formed a contractual (for stipulations and con-
sents) or quasi-contractual (for unilateral actions such as waivers and
forfeitures) relationship that the court must enforce.14 6
But why? The court is neither a party to any contract nor in priv-
ity with it. Parties may have breach-of-contract remedies or equitable
quasi-contract remedies against each other for noncompliance, but
they do not have such remedies against the court, and it would be
oddly bootstrapping if their private contract could alter the law of
contracts in a way that bound the court.
The more plausible idea is not that the court is bound by the con-
tract but rather that the court must enforce the contract as a matter of
legal directive. But what law mandates such court action? There are
two possibilities: general contract law and some federal common law
of enforcement. Each is infected with profound difficulties that are
entirely ignored in practice.
1. General Contract Law
Resort to contract law presents overwhelming obstacles. First,
any enforcement obligation on the court could be imposed only by the
contemporaneous assertion of a formal cause of action for breach of
contract (and such claims, outside indemnification claims joinable
under Rules 13 or 14,'147 are extraordinarily rare in practice). Second,
even were such a claim to be asserted, a federal court could hear it
only if the claim complied with both the Federal Rules and jurisdic-
tional statutes.48 Third, the court would have to grant specific per-
146 See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 979 (1961) (assuming
such agreements are "enforceable as a matter of ordinary contract law"); Taylor & Cliffe, supra
note 12, at 1127-37 (exploring the contract rationale); see also N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan,
916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (reading a forum-selection clause to waive chal-
lenges to the selected venue because such a challenge "would violate the duty of good faith that
modern law reads into contractual undertakings").
147 See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(5) ("A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule
against a nonparty who is or may be liable to the third-party defendant for all or part of any
claim against it.").
148 Rules 13 and 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might permit such a claim
involving primary parties, but statutory-jurisdiction principles might not. In addition, challeng-
ing the breach by way of a formal assertion of a claim through a complaint amendment or coun-
2014] 33
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
formance, a disfavored remedy that places the burden on the party
seeking enforcement to demonstrate entitlement to the remedy.14 9
Fourth, such a claim would present circular questions about the
proper procedure for adjudication (if a defendant asserts a breach-of-
contract action against a plaintiff who signed a jury-trial waiver but is
refusing to waive his jury-trial right, should the court empanel a jury
to decide the breach-of-contract claim?) and other management rou-
bles presented by such a case-within-a-case paradigm.150 And, fifth,
normal contract defenses ought to apply to any breach-of-contract
claim, yet most courts "enforcing" a litigation agreement do not apply
contract defenses in a manner faithful to contract law.15'
To be clear, I acknowledge that party agreements can give rise to
contractual obligations and a sustainable breach-of-contract laim.
But my point is that adjudicating such a claim in the same case as the
underlying substantive controversy would be incredibly difficult in
most instances. One exception might be a fee-shifting agreement hat
operates effectively like an indemnification claim potentially assert-
able as either an affirmative claim by the plaintiff or a counterclaim
under Rule 13 by the defendant (or, potentially, both).152 But such
possibilities are likely to be rare. And, even then, such a fee-shifting
agreement would not alter the legal framework for awarding fees; it
would just give rise to a private contractual relationship for re-alloca-
tion postjudgment.153 The result is that the court's power to proceed
under its own interpretation of the law, facts, and procedure remains
independent of any agreement by the parties, even if that agreement
validly binds the parties under contract law.
terclaim could be at the discretion of the court if the breach occurs relatively late in the lawsuit.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
149 Cf Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 12, at 1127 (pointing out that courts "enforcing" litiga-
tion agreements effectively order specific performance without analyzing whether specific per-
formance is an appropriate remedy).
150 Contrast these difficulties with the FAA, which replaces the need for formal assertion of
a breach of contract claim with a petition-and-order-to-arbitrate procedure. See 9 U.S.C. § 4
(2012). This mechanism, however, is limited to arbitration agreements.
151 See Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 12, at 1127-32 (documenting that ex ante contracts "are
almost automatically enforced" without regard to normal contract defenses); see also Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61
Am. J. Comp. L. 217, 247 (2013) (summarizing that "American courts are very deferential to
choice-of-forum clauses").
152 But cf Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 777 (2014) (finding a claim for fee shifting to be
independent from the underlying substantive claim for finality purposes).
153 See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199-203 (1988) (holding that, in
general, fee-shifting claims are not part of the underlying substantive claim).
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Yet to reject the contract countertheory as an a priori limit on
judicial authority is not to call it irrelevant. The fact that the parties
have entered into a valid and binding agreement or stipulation, or the
fact that one party has knowingly and intelligently waived or forfeited
rights, may be a powerful factor in the discretionary decision to defer
to the parties' lawful choices.154 My point is only that such party
choices do not deprive the court of its discretion in the first place.
2. Federal Common Law
The second possible justification is that there is some federal
common law of party-choice enforcement. The idea would be that
federal common law authorizes or requires courts to "enforce" party
choices within the context of substantive litigation and outside of the
usual doctrinal parameters of contract law.
There is precedent for the creation and use of federal common
law in this way for venue-selection clauses in admiralty cases.55 Those
cases may be workable in admiralty, which is almost entirely a crea-
ture of federal common law anyway, but they translate poorly to fed-
eral statutory and state claims.56
The reason why is that federal courts' ability to fashion common
law rules for these claims is limited. To begin, there is no federal gen-
eral common law of contract,'57 which is what "enforcement" natu-
rally appears to be. But even shy of characterizing enforcement as
contract common law, difficulties abound.
For federal claims, separation of powers principles subjugate judi-
cial common law power to congressional power. Only when strong
federal interests are at stake and when Congress has inadequately ad-
dressed those interests through codified law 58 may federal courts ex-
ercise this "unusual" law-making power.159
154 Intradistrict transfer illustrates this principle explicitly. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (2012)
("Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a civil
nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from
the division in which pending to any other division in the same district.").
155 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
156 See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1981) (asserting
that federal common law developed under admiralty jurisdiction is not freely translatable to
nonadmiralty cases).
157 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
158 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
159 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For an even narrower view of federal
common law power, see Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rav. 761, 762-64 (1989).
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For state claims, separation of powers principles limit federal pro-
cedural common law, while the Erie doctrine limits substantive com-
mon law. Venue transfer, for example, is governed by federal codified
law, not federal common law.160 And in most matters of state law,
federal courts must conduct an elaborate Erie analysis of the state and
federal interests at stake to determine whether to apply federal com-
mon law or state law. 161 Two key examples are statutes of limitations
and choice of law, areas in which federal diversity courts have no au-
thorization to craft federal common law.1 62 The result of this analysis
is that federal courts have few opportunities, except in cases of unusu-
ally strong federal interests such as jury-trial rights,'163 to create a fed-
eral common law of party-choice enforcement. And even when
federal courts do have authority to create federal common law, that
federal common law may require a rule that mirrors the applicable
state-law rule.l" Consequently, developing a robust federal common
law of "enforcement" would be very complicated indeed.165
Were federal common law viable, additional complexities would
arise in determining just how federal common law would apply. Say,
for example, that federal common law justified enforcement of a par-
ticular party choice. Would that federal common law merely provide
authorization for a court to exercise discretion? Or would it require a
court to enforce the choice? Would it matter whether the party choice
was otherwise authorized by codified law? Would a federal common
law of enforcement independently establish federal subject matter ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? These are important details, for
160 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568,
583 (2013) (relying on the venue-transfer statute, rather than a federal common law of enforce-
ment, in determining how a forum-selection clause affects venue in a diversity case); Stewart
Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31 (1988) (same).
161 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For a general discussion, see Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 17, 26-27 (2010).
162 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1945) (requiring federal courts to
apply state limitations rules to a state claim); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941) (requiring federal diversity courts to apply state choice-of-law rules).
163 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). For an Erie analy-
sis of the validity of contractual jury-trial waivers in federal court, see generally Amanda R.
Szuch, Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the Right to a Jury Trial in Federal Court, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 435 (2010).
164 See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09 (2001).
165 The Erie doctrine is notoriously challenging. For recent decisions that have splintered
the Supreme Court, see Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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federal common law is part of the "supreme law of the land" under
the Constitution, and thus must be followed by state courts as well. 16 6
To be clear, there is room in the theory of party subordinance for
a federal common law of enforcement. Law's dominance can enable
party choice to bind courts. Federal common law, if valid and applica-
ble, is no less "law" than codified law. I see no reason why federal
common law cannot enable party choice to control judicial authority
just as codified law can, and such a result would be perfectly consis-
tent with party subordinance.167 But the creation and application of
such a federal common law of enforcement would be far more compli-
cated than courts currently assume. Enforcement of ex ante agree-
ments and ex post choices is usually automatic, unexplained, and
undefended.168 Courts employ no analysis of Erie, separation of pow-
ers, or compelling federal judicial interests.169 If federal common law
is to justify a federal law of party-choice enforcement, it must first be
clearly articulated and rationalized, and it must survive the crucibles
of Erie and separation of powers. No court or commenter of which I
am aware has attempted to do so on the scale that enforcement plays
in federal courts today.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The theory of party subordinance and law's dominance has a
number of important implications and effects. This Part explores
some of those.
A. Ex Ante/Ex Post Problems
Scholars have puzzled over the significance (or lack thereof) of
the timing of parties' litigation choices, and they have tended to find
significance in the ex post permissibility of ex ante choices. For exam-
ple, Jaime Dodge follows a principle of symmetry for guiding the en-
forceability of ex ante choices: an ex ante choice is generally
enforceable if it would have been permitted ex post.170 Bob Bone
makes a similar point, calling symmetrical choices presumptively en-
166 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 897 (1986) ("[A] federal common law rule, once made,
has precisely the same force and effect as any other federal rule.").
167 For the position that substantive law can and should inform the relationship between
party prerogatives and judicial discretion, see Wolff, supra note 97.
168 See supra note 151.
169 See Symeonides, supra note 151, at 247-50 (summarizing recent cases).
170 Dodge, supra note 7, at 783-85.
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forceable but asymmetrical choices less so.1 7 1 Likewise, Gary Lawson
reasons that if a party can waive issues unilaterally in the context of
contemporaneous litigation conduct, then both parties should be able
to do so bilaterally, which is really no different from an agreement
(presumably ex ante).172 For each of these positions, the keystone
seems to be that the parties can simply time-shift an otherwise permis-
sible ex post choice to an ex ante agreement.73
Scholars also have focused on the differing informational and so-
cial circumstances surrounding ex post and ex ante choices. Bone and
Dodge, for example, each accurately note that, even for symmetrical
choices, ex ante choices are often made when information is less com-
plete and less clear than when ex post choices are made.174 Daphna
Kapeliuk and Alon Klement see meaningful differences in evaluating
the benefits of private ordering from ex ante or ex post perspec-
tives.17 5 For similar reasons, David Schwartz sees voluntary and in-
formed consent as ephemeral in many ex ante settings.17 6
The model of party subordinance-with particular emphasis on
the law's dominance-suggests a different way of viewing ex ante/ex
post distinctions. The problem is not so much one of symmetry but
rather one of compliance with the law. The principle is simple: be-
cause parties cannot alter the law, they can exercise choice only within
whatever mechanisms the law provides. Thus, if the law specifies an
ex post mechanism for exercising the choice but not an ex ante mecha-
nism, then the ex post mechanism is the only way to exercise the
choice, and the ex ante agreement just becomes a contractual promise
to utilize the legally sanctioned mechanism. As it happens, almost all
legally sanctioned mechanisms are ex post,177 so, as a practical matter,
ex ante agreements will usually stand on far different footing than ex
post choices, regardless of symmetry.
To illustrate, consider again the limitations examples from Part II
above. In the first scenario of a contract to lengthen the period from
171 Bone, supra note 9, at 1340, 1383.
172 Lawson, supra note 16, at 1210.
173 See Bone, supra note 9, at 1338.
174 Id. at 1358; Dodge, supra note 7, at 767-68 (discussing ex ante error risks of cost asym-
metries, information asymmetries, and cognitive biases); see also Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 12,
at 1105-06 (mentioning the possibility).
175 Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 16, at 1485-91.
176 See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1283-1315 (2009); see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 23, at 350-57; Linda J. De-
maine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration
Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 55, 72-74 (2004).
177 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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three years to four years, the defendant essentially covenanted not to
assert a limitations defense unless the claim was more than four years
old. Under the law, the defendant certainly could abide by that prom-
ise ex post, within the mechanism established by the procedural law,
by forfeiting the defense in a case filed timely under the contract but
untimely under the law. But if he instead reneges and timely asserts
the defense, the court must adjudicate the motion according to the law
rather than to his ex ante promise. Similarly, in the second scenario of
a contract to shorten the period from three years to two years, the
plaintiff essentially covenanted not to file a claim more than two years
old. The law certainly allows the plaintiff to decline to file an action
more than two years after accrual, thereby effectuating the ex ante
intentions of the parties. But if she instead files such an action, her ex
ante promise does not render her claim untimely.
In each case, the law allows the ex post actions covenanted by the
parties ex ante. And nothing prohibits parties from entering into such
an ex ante contract. But the distinction is that the ex post actions are
easily enforceable by the courts, while the ex ante covenants are not.
The law governs what the court can do, and the parties' agreements
do not alter the law. In the hypotheticals, the law allows only ex post
conduct, and thus ex post conduct is the only way for parties to ensure
effectuation of their intentions. If one party fails to act as promised,
the actual-not the promised-ex post conduct will govern, leaving
the other party with a potential, and separate, claim for breach of
contract.
The same principle extends throughout the procedural law.17s
Say a telephone subscriber agrees to waive all jury-trial rights in any
lawsuit against the provider. The law, however, sets out a very specific
way for a party to forfeit the jury-trial right: by failing to demand it in
accordance with Rules 38 and 39 after litigation has commenced.179
Thus, the subscriber's ex ante jury-trial waiver has not waived her
jury-trial right; rather, the subscriber has promised to, in the context
of any future litigation, forfeit the jury-trial right (or perhaps enter
178 See Part II.A.2 (using limitations examples to illustrate why ex post actions control over
ex ante agreements).
179 FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d) ("A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served
and filed."); id. 39(a) ("When a jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the action must be
designated on the docket as a jury action. The trial on all issues so demanded must be by
jury . . . ."); cf Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 485 (Cal. 2005) (interpret-
ing the California rules to be the exclusive mechanism for waiving jury-trial rights under Califor-
nia law).
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into a stipulation of a nonjury trial)180 in accordance with the ex post
procedures established by law.181 If the subscriber properly demands
a jury trial in contravention of her promise, she may breach her con-
tract, but she will be entitled to a jury. Of course, the dominance of
the law means that the law could provide for ex ante waivers. For
example, Rule 38(d) could state: "A party waives a jury trial by enter-
ing into a valid contract waiving its jury-trial rights or by failing to file
and serve a written demand in accordance with Rule 38(b)." 182 But at
present, neither the Rules nor federal statutes allow jury-trial waivers
outside the ex post forfeiture mechanism in Rule 38.183
To be clear, neither ex ante nor ex post conduct binds courts on
the underlying substantive right. But ex ante conduct is even weaker
than ex post conduct, for while ex post conduct is enforceable against
the parties in the context of the litigation, ex ante conduct is not.
B. Types of "Waiver"
Although legal nomenclature tends to sweep various party
choices into a single concept of "waiver," the choices have formal dis-
tinctions. Black's Law Dictionary defines "consent" as "[a]greement,
approval, or permission as to some act or purpose."18 4 "Forfeiture" is
"[t]he loss of a right ... because of . .. breach of obligation, or neglect
of duty."185 A "stipulation" is "[a] voluntary agreement between op-
posing parties concerning some relevant point." 18 6 "Waiver" is "[t]he
voluntary relinquishment or abandonment-express or implied-of a
legal right or advantage."187 The distinctions can be subtle and often
difficult to glean in practice.'"
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has fixated on these subtle dis-
tinctions and elevated their significance for resolving conflicts be-
180 FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(1) (allowing parties to stipulate-after a proper jury-trial de-
mand-to a nonjury trial).
181 See Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 12, at 1086 n.6.
182 Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 360.5 (West 2014) (providing that written ex ante waivers
of limitations defenses uffice to waive the defense). I leave to the side whether such a Federal
Rule would violate the Rules Enabling Act.
183 Lower courts routinely hold that ex ante jury-trial waivers themselves effectively waive
the jury right. See 9 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2321 (3d ed. 2008). However, they have not articulated a convincing argument
for enforcing these waivers.
184 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009).
185 Id. at 722.
186 Id. at 1550.
187 Id. at 1770.
188 Cf Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-29, Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (No.
10-9995) (exposing the Justices' struggles with the terms).
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tween party choice and judicial authority.189 In past opinions, the
Court has distinguished between an intentional and knowing relin-
quishment (waiver) and the failure to preserve a right (forfeiture).190
That distinction has achieved doctrinal significance in recent habeas
corpus opinions. In Granberry v. Greer,191 for example, the Court
held that a court of appeals may consider a forfeited exhaustion de-
fense to a habeas petition if the defense was "inadvertently" over-
looked by the state.192 Several years later, in Day v. McDonough,'19 3
the Court held that a district court has authority to resurrect forfeited,
but not waived, limitations defenses to a habeas petition.194 In the
2012 case of Wood v. Milyard,1 9 5 the Court held similarly, explaining
that the "distinction" between forfeiture and waiver "is key to our
decision,"196 and ruling that a court of appeals may resurrect a for-
feited-but not a waived-habeas limitations defense.19 7 It is worth
noting that Granberry, Day, and Wood relied upon the unique context
of habeas corpus, which implicates systemic federalism concerns be-
yond the private interests of the parties, in recognizing these limited
exceptions to the general rule of judicial passivity.198
The theory of party subordinance suggests that there is less here
than meets the eye, at least when it comes to the first-order question
of judicial or party dominance.199 Unless the law itself cabins judicial
189 Commentators have latched on to these distinctions as well. See, e.g., David H. Taylor,
The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 817-18 (1993)
(defining waiver as the refusal to challenge personal jurisdiction, and consent as the attempt to
expand the court's jurisdictional authority).
190 See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 n.4 (2012) ("A waived claim or defense is
one that a party has knowingly and intelligently relinquished; a forfeited plea is one that a party
has merely failed to preserve."); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (defining for-
feiture and noting that the terms are distinct). If this distinction is accurate, then the law is rife
with misuse of the terms. For example, the inadvertent failure to include defenses in pleadings
would seem to be a forfeiture, not a waiver as Rule 12(h) characterizes it. Compare FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(h) (calling it a "waiver"), with Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) ("Ordinarily in
civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant's answer or in
an amendment thereto.").
191 Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
192 Id. at 134.
193 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006).
194 Id. at 202.
195 Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012).
196 Id. at 1832 n.4.
197 Id. at 1834-35.
198 Id. at 1834; Day, 547 U.S. at 205; Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-35 (1987).
199 It is not clear how these opinions speak to the different steps of authority and discre-
tion. Wood, for its part, states that courts have the authority to raise "a forfeited timeliness
defense" sua sponte but abuse their discretion when they raise a waived timeliness defense.
Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1834-35. If the Court meant that both waived and forfeited defenses are
2014] 41
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
authority differently based upon some distinction between forfeiture
and waiver, then courts have authority to raise issues subjected to ei-
ther kind of party conduct and irrespective of any systemic interests
like federalism. In that vein, Justice Thomas, concurring only in the
judgment in Wood, was correct to assert that "there is no principled
reason to distinguish between forfeited and waived limitations de-
fenses when determining whether courts may raise such defenses sua
sponte."200 Of course, the circumstances of the party conduct (inad-
vertence or voluntariness or intent) and the implication of any sys-
temic interests (federalism or docket control) might be factors in
whether a court should exercise its discretion (or even whether a court
might abuse its discretion) in raising the lost issue sua sponte. But the
finer distinctions between waiver, forfeiture, and even stipulations and
consents are irrelevant to the question of the hierarchy between party
choice and judicial authority unless the law expressly makes them rel-
evant. As such, under party subordinance, the burden of grappling
with these terms is alleviated.
C. Existing Private-Ordering Conversations
The ongoing conversation on the normative value of private or-
dering substantially elides the formal order of law, courts, and parties.
That is a mistake, because party subordination and law's dominance
affect this conversation in important ways.
Most profoundly, the theory suggests that current scholarship ap-
proaches private procedural contracts backwards. Scholars today fo-
cus on when courts should permit parties to contract for procedures
not sanctioned by existing law, an inquiry that is founded on a pre-
sumption-and-exceptions model of party dominance.201 But, if parties
are subordinate, then in most cases such contracts will violate the law
and will therefore be unenforceable. Thus, proposals such as Robert
Rhee's (advocating for party power to alter the applicable burden of
proof in exchange for fee shifting202), Robert Scott and George Trian-
tis's (that parties should be able to adjust standards of proof2o3), Gary
within the authority of a court to raise sua sponte, I would agree wholeheartedly. But given the
Court's emphasis that the distinction between forfeiture and waiver "is key to our decision," id.
at 1832 n.4, it is hard to take Wood's use of the term "forfeiture" to mean "forfeiture and
waiver."
200 Id. at 1836 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 1042-43.
202 Rhee, supra note 9, at 536.
203 Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 857-58.
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Lawson's (that legal stipulations should be enforceable204), and David
Marcus's (that parties are presumptively subordinate but that courts
have discretion to balance the benefits of private ordering against any
"extraindividual interests"205) can be adopted only by positive-law en-
actment and not by judicial discretion. Party subordinance to the law
severely constrains-in a way largely ignored by the literature-the
universe of procedural contracting available to the parties.
Meanwhile, proponents of judicial authority based on the public
dimension of courts (such as Amanda Frost206 ), or on the ex post im-
permissibility of ex ante conduct (such as Jaime Dodge207), or on the
protection of judicial decisionmaking (like Bob Bone208) appear to
treat judicial intervention as exceptional, relatively circumscribed, and
requiring some specific justification for overriding party choice. But
the theory of party subordinance to courts posits instead that judicial
authority is broad and largely unfettered. Any limitation on that au-
thority-not the scope of authority itself-requires justification.
Finally, arguments focusing on judicial responses to lawful party
choices, such as Joan Steinman's (arguing that "the general rule
against appellate consideration of new issues should truly be the pre-
sumptive position taken by appellate courts"20 9), are consistent with
the theory of party subordinance but are generally irrelevant to its
scope. Instead, such arguments are relegated to the second-order dis-
cretionary task of determining whether to defer to or override those
party choices.
D. Practical Effects
The theory of party subordinance and law's dominance has im-
portant practical implications for procedural customization outside of
arbitration agreements governed by the FAA. Because parties cannot
bind courts or change the law, the effectuation of privatization is less
predictable; parties cannot bank on the results they hope for. The
predictability is even less reliable for ex ante contracts, because either
204 Lawson, supra note 16, at 1196.
205 Marcus, supra note 10, at 1042-43.
206 Frost, supra note 17, at 452-53; see also Bone, supra note 9, at 1362 ("[T]he judge has
the power to deny enforcement to any procedures that sharply conflict with a statute's public
goals.").
207 Dodge, supra note 7, at 784; see also Bone, supra note 9, at 1383 (making similar points
about symmetry between ex ante and ex post permissibilities).
208 Bone, supra note 9, at 1393.
209 Steinman, supra note 47, at 1613; see also Martineau, supra note 17, at 1059-60 (making
a similar argument).
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the parties or the court may disrupt what the parties originally agreed
to. Liability waivers, for example, are not grounds for dismissal of a
claim unless the substantive law (law's dominance) treats such waivers
as extinguishing the claim. Ex ante jury-trial waivers are not them-
selves waivers but rather merely promises to decline to assert a jury
demand in the context of litigation. Of course, parties have broader
power to make reliably enforceable litigation choices under the
FAA, 2 10 but outside that unique context, party choice offers considera-
bly less certainty.
There are, clearly, serious normative concerns with these effects.
The loss of an important ex ante vehicle for reducing uncertainty and
for streamlining procedure may have severe commercial implications.
Similarly, the degradation of ex post waiver and forfeiture enforce-
ment to a discretionary analysis could bog down courts and result in
costs to both parties and the judicial system. After all, parties, relying
on supposed judicial passivity, may allocate resources differently de-
pending upon what issues they expect to press and defend.211 The pos-
sibility of judicial intervention introduces considerable risk of
unexpected costs and disrupted strategy.
Further, the available remedy in the event of a breach of an ex
ante agreement-a formal separate breach of contract claim-may be
untenable. Proving causation or damages from breach of, say, a jury-
waiver provision, could be impossible.212 Even if successful, the par-
ties have taken the long way around-wasting court time in the pro-
cess-to getting to the end result. It is conceivable, for example, that
parties to an ex ante claim waiver might nevertheless litigate the sub-
stantive claim in one court and, if the plaintiff prevails, then litigate a
breach-of-contract action in a second litigation, with the damages
remedy being the entire recovery (and potentially costs and attorney's
fees) from the first litigation.
Finally, the devaluation of privatized procedure, resulting in im-
poverished diversity of procedural choice, risks siphoning cases out of
court entirely and into arbitration. If parties are forced into a binary
choice between court procedures over which they have no control and
arbitration over which they have plenary control, they may predomi-
210 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (allowing
waiver of class action arbitration in the face of contrary state law).
211 See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp., Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th Cir.
1996) (Posner, J.) (explaining that the general rule may lull a party into presenting its case
differently).
212 Cf Dodge, supra note 7, at 753 & n.121 (calculating some jury waivers as amounting to
a ninety percent verdict discount).
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nantly choose arbitration, resulting in removal from the courts of dis-
putes with significant public import.
These normative concerns are substantial. But they do not an-
swer the descriptive question. The concerns are the faults of a rigidly
independent public legal system.213 If they are too much to bear, there
may be ways to mitigate or avoid them.
For example, Congress and rulemakers can change the law to em-
power party choice and give parties control over courts. Such change
can be wholesale or selective, depending upon the particular issue at
stake. Many rules already specifically authorize parties to exercise
choice in the structure of litigation in a number of circumstances, in-
cluding settlement, amendment, discovery, and trial.214 Others can be
amended to incorporate ex ante choice. And for lawful ex post
choices, the practical effects of judicial override may be so norma-
tively distasteful as to be dispositive in the exercise of judicial discre-
tion to defer to those choices.
Where the law does not alleviate the normative concerns, parties
have other options. To bolster breach of contract claims, parties could
add liquidated-damages clauses.215 To avoid duplicative litigation,
parties could litigate the validity of the contract first in a declaratory
judgment action, the determination of which might serve as a serious
deterrent to breach. Or, parties could structure the contract as an in-
demnification agreement, which might then be joinable in any ensuing
litigation.216
Finally, parties can choose alternate forms of dispute resolution.
Arbitration, for example, "is a consensual contractual process in-
tended to be an alternative to (and not a copy of) litigation,"217 and
for the purely private goal of dispute resolution,2 1 8 in which parties are
free to create their own rules (at least within the boundaries of con-
tract law), including the ability to dispense with precedent and even
213 These risks have manifested themselves in the past in spectacular fashion. The defen-
dant in Erie, for example, wished desperately to preserve the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1
(1842), and may have made a more significant plea for it (or even have settled the case) had it
known that the Court was considering overruling it. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of
Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIEs 21, 48-49 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
214 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
215 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 855-56.
216 See id. at 867-69.
217 Paul Bennett Marrow, Can an Arbitrator Conduct Independent Legal Research? If Not,
Why Not?, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2013, at 25.
218 Arbitration awards generally are confidential and nonprecedential. See id.
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written reasoning in certain kinds of arbitration.21 9 If parties think the
risk that their choices in federal court will be disregarded is too high,
they are free to choose a private forum that would allow more free-
dom of customization.
As for the risk that a binary choice between court and arbitration
will divert too many public-law cases into private arbitration, I see two
possible remedies. First, applicable conflict-of-laws rules could ex-
pressly incorporate parties' choice-of-law agreements, potentially of-
fering parties a more palatable array of public legal regimes from
which to choose to govern their dispute.220 Second, the federal gov-
ernment can use the costs saved by the federal courts from the diver-
sion of cases to arbitration to fund more direct regulatory
enforcement of public norms.
This brief discussion cannot possibly give these implications the
attention they deserve. I mean only to acknowledge the significant
repercussions of the theory of party subordinance and sketch out
some paths for future thought.
IV. APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC DOCTRINES
The theory of party subordinance also affects a number of proce-
dural doctrinal matters, with particular relevance to some recent opin-
ions from the Supreme Court. I discuss a few here.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction has always been waivable and consent-
able.2 2 1 The question is whether the defendant's waiver or consent
merely disables the defendant from raising the procedural right to as-
sert the defense or whether the defendant's waiver or consent actually
expands the scope of the court's jurisdiction as a matter of jurisdic-
tional law.
If party conduct affects only the procedural right to assert the
defense, then a court that exercises personal jurisdiction only on the
basis of consent or waiver does so not because it now has personal
jurisdiction but rather because the defendant is unable to force the
court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.222 Under this con-
ceptualization, the court nevertheless could exercise its discretion-
219 Rau, supra note 8.
220 I discuss some obstacles to this possibility below. See infra text accompanying notes
242-46.
221 See, e.g., Hess v. Palowski, 274 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1927).
222 See Taylor, supra note 189, at 816-17.
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under the theory of party subordination to judicial authority-to dis-
regard the defendant's conduct and dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction on its own.
If instead the law of personal jurisdiction itself allows party con-
duct to alter its scope, then party consent, waiver, or forfeiture actu-
ally enlarges the scope of the court's adjudicatory authority and
extends personal jurisdiction over the defendant where there was no
personal jurisdiction before.223 In that case, the court has no discre-
tion to override or ignore the defendant's conduct; the court obtains
personal jurisdiction by operation of law at the moment of party
action.
Note that, under the first conceptualization of waiver as having
only procedural effects, ex ante consent is irrelevant to the scope of
personal jurisdiction but may be relevant to the second-stage analysis
of whether a court should exercise sua sponte authority to enforce
those personal jurisdiction limits. If the defendant enters into an ex
ante agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular court and
then, once sued, abides by the agreement and forfeits the defense,
then a court, though having the power to override that forfeiture and
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, almost certainly will not exer-
cise such discretion in light of the parties' ex ante commitments.
Under the second conceptualization of consent and waiver as al-
tering the substantive scope of personal jurisdiction, ex ante consent
will deprive the defendant of the ability to assert the defense success-
fully ex post. Importantly, the ex ante agreement is not then a prom-
ise by the defendant to abstain from asserting the defense ex post but
rather itself a vehicle for broadening the scope of personal jurisdic-
tion. Thus, a court faced with a timely motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction filed by a defendant who had consented to juris-
diction ex ante should deny the motion not as an enforcement of an ex
ante promise to refuse to assert the defense but rather because the
court actually has personal jurisdiction by virtue of the defendant's ex
ante consent.
Why is all of this important? Because the legal relationship be-
tween personal jurisdiction and its waiver is visibly unsettled. In J.
223 More nuanced possibilities exist if consent, waiver, and forfeiture are treated differently
by the doctrine. For example, express consent might enlarge the scope of personal jurisdiction
while forfeiture might merely deny the defendants the procedural option. For some commentary
on the possibilities, see id., which contrasts unilateral ex post waivers with bilateral ex ante
consents.
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McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro2 24 four justices on the Supreme
Court viewed personal jurisdiction as a matter of the limits of sover-
eign power,22 5 which, the Court previously suggested, cannot be al-
tered by party choice.226 Party forfeiture, consent, and waiver may
affect the procedural right of the defendant to gain a dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction, but it does not change the underlying scope of
a sovereign's jurisdiction over the defendant. And a court then would
maintain the power to override a defendant's forfeiture of the defense
and dismiss based on the lack of personal jurisdiction.
But in Nicastro, three justices viewed consent as part of the doc-
trine's contours. They viewed personal jurisdiction in terms of fair-
ness, which itself is influenced by party choice.22 7 For them, then,
consent is both highly relevant and immediately enforceable, for once
a party consents to personal jurisdiction or waives the defense, it be-
comes fair for a court to assert jurisdiction, and the scope of jurisdic-
tion then expands to cover the party. Under the dissenters' view, a
court should have no discretion to override valid consent, for that con-
sent has automatically expanded the scope of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs face forum issues as well. Consider the following agree-
ment that YouTube previously extracted from certain users as a condi-
tion of visiting its website: "[T]he YouTube Website shall be deemed a
passive website that does not give rise to personal jurisdiction over
YouTube, either specific or general, in jurisdictions other than
California."2 28
Unlike the personal jurisdiction doctrine illustrated in cases like
Nicastro, in which consent is defendant-centric and permissive (i.e.,
meant to broaden the range of forums available to hear the dispute
over objections of defendants), this forum-selection agreement is
224 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
225 See id. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
226 See Ins. Corp. of Ire., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10
(1982) ("[I]f the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign
power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement:
Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject
himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected."); cf Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 720 (1877) ("The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits
of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits
would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption
of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.").
227 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228 Bowen v. YouTube, Inc., No. Co8-5050FDB, 2008 WL 1757578, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 15, 2008). For the most recent iteration of YouTube's website agreement, see Terms of
Service, YouTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms.
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plaintiff-centric and restrictive; its primary goal in fact is to limit the
plaintiff to a single geographic forum even if, absent the agreement,
other forums could hear the dispute. Now say a resident of Washing-
ton recently used the YouTube website under this agreement. A dis-
pute arises, and the user sues YouTube in Washington.229 Say that,
absent the agreement, a court in Washington could lawfully assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over YouTube in this lawsuit based on minimum
contacts and the Washington long-arm statute. Nevertheless, You-
Tube moves to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Must the court dismiss?
No. Nothing in the law of personal jurisdiction enables a party to
unilaterally (or even bilaterally, as between the parties) reduce the
power of the state by shrinking the scope of personal jurisdiction oth-
erwise applicable.230 Instead, the YouTube agreement is akin to the
example above illustrating an agreement o reduce the applicable limi-
tations period.231 The user may have promised to sue only in Califor-
nia, but that promise neither alters the law nor binds the court.
YouTube might have a breach of contract action against a user for
suing in Washington, but if Washington undeniably has personal juris-
diction over YouTube for the underlying dispute, a court has no basis
for dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground
that the agreement has ousted the court of personal jurisdiction.232
B. Venue Selection
The YouTube website also contained the following venue-restrict-
ing language: "Any claim or dispute between you and YouTube that
arises in whole or in part from the YouTube Website shall be decided
exclusively by a court of competent jurisdiction located in San Mateo
County, California." 23 3
Much like the inability of YouTube to narrow the scope of per-
sonal jurisdiction, the parties cannot narrow the scope of what the law
229 This occurred in Bowen, which upheld and enforced the language of the agreement.
Bowen, 2008 WL 1757578, at *2-3.
230 Theoretically, personal jurisdiction law could allow itself to be narrowed by party con-
duct, but I do not see room for that possibility in the doctrine's current form.
231 See supra Part II.A.2.
232 The Court does not understand forum-restriction clauses to shrink the scope of personal
jurisdiction, even in admiralty cases. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
588-89 (1991) (distinguishing between forum-selection clauses and personal jurisdiction); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (explaining that the district court was not
"ousted" of jurisdiction).
233 Bowen, 2008 WL 1757578, at *2. For the most recent iteration of YouTube's website
agreement, see Terms of Service, YouTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms.
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deems an appropriate venue.2 3 4 Venue law sets out the permissible
venues and does not allow those options to be ousted by narrower
party agreements.2 35 Thus, a user may properly sue YouTube in any
venue permitted by law, notwithstanding any venue-restriction
agreement.
That does not mean that restrictive forum-selection clauses like
YouTube's are meaningless. To the contrary, they can strongly sup-
port a venue transfer under federal statutory law, which expressly al-
lows transfer to the parties' chosen court "[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice."236 Forum-selec-
tion agreements are relevant to those factors.237 Further, venue trans-
fers may be made by the court sua sponte.238 YouTube then could
attempt to recover its expenses associated with the venue-transfer mo-
tion through a breach of contract action against the user.
The rub of all of this is that restrictive forum-selection clauses
may be "enforced" by a court not by displacing venue law with the
parties' agreement and dismissing for improper venue239 but rather by
transferring venue to the selected court (or possibly dismissing under
forum non conveniens if the agreement specifies a court outside the
federal system). Thus, it would be wrong for a court to conclude that
a restrictive forum-selection clause waives personal jurisdiction and
venue objections240 or, as some commentators have suggested, renders
an otherwise proper venue improper.241
234 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568,
577-78 (2013).
235 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012); Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 578 (interpreting § 1391 to be the
controlling definition of proper venue).
236 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
237 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31
(1988). Atlantic Marine unwisely goes further to make restrictive forum-selection clauses dispos-
itive of § 1404(a)'s "convenience of the parties." See At!. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580. For a fuller
consideration of Atlantic Marine in the context of party subordination, see Scott Dodson, Atlan-
tic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 HASTINGs L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2477205.
238 See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006).
239 Section 1404, not § 1406 and Rule 12(b)(3), would apply if venue is proper in the origi-
nal court under § 1391.
240 But see N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)
(stating that "since a defendant is deemed to waive (that is, he forfeits) objections to personal
jurisdiction or venue simply by not making them in timely fashion, a potential defendant can
waive such objections in advance of suit by signing a forum selection clause").
241 See, e.g., Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, Supreme Court Update, AALS Civ. PROC. SEC.
NEWSL., Fall 2013, at 5 (questioning the Court's use of § 1404 and rejection of § 1406); cf Brief
of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5-6, Atl. Marine
Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013) (No. 12-929), 2013
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Under the theory of party subordinance, however, "enforces" is
probably the wrong term to describe how a court uses a forum-selec-
tion agreement. The statute-not the agreement-guides the exercise
of the venue-transfer discretion of the court. That the statute incorpo-
rates factors that are reflected in a private agreement does not result
in "enforcement" of the agreement as if the party agreement domi-
nates over the law and forces judicial action; rather, the statute's in-
corporation merely results in following the statute in recognition of
law's dominance.
C. Choice of Law
Another common party agreement is to specify the law applicable
to a dispute.242 Under prevailing doctrine, parties can select the appli-
cable law as long as there is some rational basis for doing so.2 4 3 But
the theory of party subordinance suggests that things are more com-
plicated. The applicable choice-of-law rules, not the parties' agree-
ment, control the inquiry. However the governing conflict rules treat
parties' choice of law-as dispositive, as a presumption, as merely a
factor, or as irrelevant-so must the court.2 44 And a federal court ad-
judicating a state claim must undertake a preliminary Erie analysis,
which generally will direct the court to apply a state's choice-of-law
rules rather than federal choice-of-law rules245 which may differ on
the deference afforded to parties' choice of law. That the parties se-
lect-even for rational reasons-a set of official laws already available
in another jurisdiction is irrelevant.246 The forum court must apply the
WL 3362094 (insisting that a restrictive forum-selection clause does not render a proper venue
improper but nevertheless agreeing that a permissive forum-selection clause can render an oth-
erwise improper venue proper). But see Marcus, supra note 10, at 1038 (arguing, correctly, that
nonadmiralty venue-clause enforcement should be through § 1404(a)).
242 See Hoffman, supra note 7.
243 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-13 (1981); see also Symeonides, upra
note 151, at 241-42 (summarizing that "in the vast majority of cases, American courts uphold
choice-of-law clauses," though they "continue to require some 'significant connection' between
the contract and the chosen state").
244 For example, the Second Restatement, which some states follow, defers to party choice.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). The Uniform Commercial Code
also defers to choice-of-law agreements. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1989).
245 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (directing federal
courts to apply state choice-of-law rules to state claims).
246 But cf Bone, supra note 9, at 1339 (defending choice-of-law provisions as "merely se-
lect[ing] among different sets of official rules"); Lawson, supra note 16, at 1210 (stating that
choice-of-law provisions are usually accepted if within the realm of independently lawful
options).
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applicable choice-of-law rules-not the parties'-to determine what
substantive law applies.
D. Motion Waivers
For ex post waivers of certain procedural rights normally pre-
served via motion, the theory of party subordinance may suggest a
rethinking of cases disclaiming judicial authority to enforce procedu-
ral rights in those contexts. Take, for example, Rule 29 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that a motion for judgment
of acquittal after a guilty verdict must be made within fourteen days of
the jury's discharge.2 4 7 In Carlisle v. United States,248 the Supreme
Court held that a district court had no power to enter a judgment of
acquittal absent a timely motion under Rule 29.249 In the Court's
view, the defendant's forfeiture constrained the authority of the
court.250
I suggest that this holding be reconsidered. The first step in re-
consideration should be to recognize the court's authority to enter a
judgment of acquittal in favor of a legally innocent defendant. The
next step should be to determine whether Rule 29-or any other
rule-expressly restricts that authority upon the failure of the defen-
dant to file a timely motion. If the answer is no, then the court has the
power to override the defendant's forfeiture in the exercise of its
discretion.
In response to similar points made by the dissent,2 5 1 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Carlisle majority, stated that such a framework "would
create an odd system in which defense counsel could move for judg-
ment of acquittal for only seven days after the jury's discharge, but the
court's power to enter such a judgment would linger."252 But that is
not so odd. It accords perfectly with the theory of party subordinance
and is reflected in countless other doctrines, including those recog-
nized by Justice Scalia.2 5 3 The deadline simply reflects the effect of
247 FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
248 Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996).
249 Id. at 433. At the time of the case, the statutory period was seven days. Id. at 418.
250 Id. at 426.
251 Id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The exercise of the court's inherent power to set
aside a jury verdict unsupported by evidence is not contingent on the filing of a timely motion by
the defendant. ... [T]he question is whether that Rule [29] withdraws the court's pre-existing
authority to refrain from entering judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it knows to
be legally innocent.").
252 Id. at 422.
253 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
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forfeiture on the defendant's procedural ability to secure a judgment
of acquittal; it does not constrain the court's authority (though per-
haps the rule could be written to do so). Does this then render super-
fluous, as Justice Scalia thinks, the need for any motion at all?25 4 I
think not. A timely motion forces the court to decide the issue of the
legal sufficiency of the evidence to convict. A forfeited motion gives
the court discretion, but not the obligation, to consider the issue, a
much riskier proposition for the defendant. The scenario is compara-
ble to the parties' power to move for a new trial in a civil case, which
is coupled with the court's own independent authority to grant a new
trial sua sponte.255 Carlisle, then, ought to be reconsidered.
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.2 56 presents a
similar case study. There, the Supreme Court held that a court of ap-
peals lacks the power to order a new trial in a civil case for insuffi-
ciency of the evidence if the appellant failed either to file a postverdict
Rule 50(b) motion or to request a new trial under Rule 59.257 Al-
though Rule 50 says nothing about binding appellate courts, the Court
relied both upon prior precedent establishing the requirement of a
postverdict motion258 and upon practical reasons, such as district-court
competence and litigant fairness.259
Unitherm fails to distinguish between forfeiture's effects on par-
ties and forfeiture's effects on the courts. It may be true, as the Court
stated, that "a party is not entitled to pursue a new trial on appeal
unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict motion in the dis-
trict court,"26 0 or that a party's "failure to comply with Rule 50(b)
forecloses its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence [on ap-
peal],"261 or that "a litigant that has failed to file a Rule 50(b) motion
is foreclosed from seeking the relief it sought in its Rule 50(a) mo-
tion." 26 2 But that does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that any
court was so foreclosed. The Court's conclusion that a party's failure
to make a postverdict motion left the district court "without the power
254 Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 430-31.
255 See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
256 Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
257 Id. at 396.
258 Id. at 401-02 ("This Court's observations about the necessity of a postverdict motion
under Rule 50(b), and the benefits of the district court's input at that stage, apply with equal
force whether a party is seeking judgment as a matter of law or simply a new trial.").
259 Id.
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[to order a new trial]"263 is true only if the rule expressly subjugates
court power to party waiver, which it does not.2 64 Thus, as the dissent
recognized, the court of appeals had the power and discretion to con-
sider grounds for a new trial. 2 65  Unitherm likewise should be
reconsidered.
These cases illustrate how the theory of party subordinance ought
to apply to motion forfeitures and ex post party conduct more
broadly. Together with law's dominance, the theory counsels whole-
sale rethinking of the way the legal system frames the relationship
among parties, the court, and the law.
CONCLUSION
This Article systematically explored a theory of party
subordinance, which posits that parties' litigation choices do not alter
the law unless the law allows alteration, and that even when the law
allows alteration, courts are not bound by litigant choices except when
the law makes that choice binding. This theory offers opportunities to
rethink both scholarly commentary and existing doctrine.
I conclude by identifying two paths for further thought. First,
conceptualizing court power as inviolate, with party choice informing
the discretionary exercise of that power, helps assuage tensions result-
ing from disparate results in various doctrines, because discretion-as
opposed to mandatory rules-can better tolerate inconsistency in ap-
plication. The theory thus may have insights for the enduring debate
over rules, standards, mandates, and discretion.
Second, the discretion helps balance the law-pronouncing and er-
ror-correcting functions of the courts and reorients the role of the
judge as less passive than some would view it. As Judge Learned
Hand famously proclaimed: "A judge, at least in a federal court, is
more than a moderator; he is affirmatively charged with securing a
263 Id. at 405.
264 Of course, Rule 59 does set other binding limits on a district court's discretion, but they
are a product of positive law, not party decision. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
265 Unithern, 546 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt may be unfair or even an abuse
of discretion for a court of appeals to direct a verdict in favor of the party that lost below if that
party failed to make a timely Rule 50(b) motion. Likewise, it may not be 'just under the circum-
stances' for a court of appeals to order a new trial in the absence of a proper Rule 59 motion.
Finally, a court of appeals has discretion to rebuff, on grounds of waiver or forfeiture, a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence absent a proper Rule 50(b) or Rule 59 motion made in
the district court. None of the foregoing propositions rests, however, on a determination that
the courts of appeals lack 'power' to review the sufficiency of the evidence and order appropri-
ate relief under these circumstances . . . .").
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fair trial, and he must intervene sua sponte to that end, when neces-
sary."266 For now, I remain silent on whether that is for good or for ill.
266 Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir. 1933) (Hand, J.).
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